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Originality's Other Path
Joseph P. Fishman*
Although the U.S. Supreme Court has famously spoken of a
"historickinship" between patent and copyright doctrine, the family
resemblance is sometimes hard to see. One of the biggest differences
between them today is how much ingenuity they requirefor earning
protection. Obtainingapatent requiresan invention so innovative that
it would not have been obvious to aperson having ordinaryskill in the
art. Copyright, by contrast, makes no such demand on authors. It

requires an original work of only minimal creativity.
Except sometimes it doesn't. Puzzlingly, in some copyright cases
dealing with musical arrangements, courts have demanded a patentlike level of creativityfrom putative authors. While these cases might
seem like outliers, they have apedigree that is both lengthy andlargely
unrecognized. The proposition that copyright originality should
requirepatent-style inventiveness beyond artisans'everyday creations
dates back to an 1850 music-infringement decision by Justice Samuel
Nelson. In fact, only four months later, Nelson himself would author
the Supreme Court patent opinion that is now credited as the
touchstone for patent law's own nonobviousness doctrine. His
correspondingvision for copyright, though, came first.
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Drawing on original archival research, this Article challenges
the standardaccount of what originality doctrine is and what courts
can do with it. It identifies Nelson'sforgotten copyright legacy: a stillgrowing line of cases that treats music differently, sometimes even
more analogously to patentable inventions than to other authorial
works. These decisions seem to function as a hidden enclave within
originality's larger domain, playing by rules that others couldn't get
away with. They form originality'sotherpath, much less trod than the

familiar one but with a doctrinalstory of its own to tell. Originality
and nonobviousness's parallel beginnings reveal a period of leaky
boundaries between copyright andpatent, when many of the Justices
considered a rule for one to be just as good for the other. Their
recurring intersections, meanwhile, muddy today's conventional
narrativeabout copyright's historiccommitment to protectingeven the
most modestly creative works.
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INTRODUCTION

[A]n opera is more like a patented invention than like a common
book....
Thomas v. Lennon, 18831

The Supreme Court has famously spoken of a "historic kinship" between
copyright and patent law, which both seek to encourage their own form of

1.

Thomas v. Lennon, 14 F. 849, 853 (Lowell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1883).
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creative production by granting exclusive rights.2 Sometimes, though, the family
resemblance is hard to see. One of the biggest differences between the two
regimes is how much ingenuity they require for earning legal protection. Under
copyright's originality standard, a work of authorship need only "possess[] at
least some minimal degree of creativity," a bar that the Supreme Court has
emphasized is "extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice." 3 Earning a
patent, by contrast, requires far more. An invention must not "have been
obvious . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed
invention pertains." 4 As the Court has stressed in its most recent interpretation
of this nonobviousness standard, the bar is meant to be high enough to exclude
"the results of ordinary innovation." 5
Most intellectual property (IP) commentators today think that this
difference in legal protection is sensible, and there's a large literature devoted to
justifying it. 6 One argument is that the two fields are simply trying to maximize
different things, with patents trying to funnel activity into a problem's most
efficient solution and copyright trying to generate the widest abundance of
information possible. 7 Another is that users of technological goods tend to
welcome a high degree of newness, while audiences for expressive works tend
to devalue works that they deem too new.8 Still another is that, even if copyright
had a good reason to encourage works of greater creativity, it lacks the sort of
objective criterion for assessing value that patent law can deploy for scientific
inventions. 9 While these theories differ, they all end up in the same place: a
patent should require the demonstration of above-average ingenuity, and a
copyright should not. And that's exactly what the two bodies of law give us.
Except when they don't. Puzzlingly, in some copyright cases involving

music, courts have demanded a patent-like level of creativity from putative

&

2. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984); cf
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright as Market Prospect, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 443, 476 (2018) ("The
Court's logic here . . was . . steeped inthe recognitionthatboth emanated from the same constitutional
source, which in turn specified a common normative goal forboth institutions: 'promoting the Progress,'
a goal that needed to produce similar outcomes in both regimes through the use of similar principles.").
3. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
4. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
5. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007).
6. For a survey, see Christopher Buccafusco, Zachary C. Burns, Jeanne C. Fromer
Christopher Jon Sprigman, Experimental Tests ofIntellectualPropertyLaws' CreativityThresholds, 92
TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1928-31 (2014). But see Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 451 (2009) (arguing in favor of a more patent-like originality threshold in copyright law); Gideon
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV. 1505 (2009) (arguing that works of greater
originality should receive stronger protection).
7. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 2.2.1.1 (3d ed. 2020 Supp. 2021-1).
8. See Jeanne C. Fromer,A Psychology oflntellectualProperty, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1441,147174, 1479-83 (2010).
9. See Erlend Lavik & Stef van Gompel, On the Prospects of Raising the Originality
Requirementin CopyrightLaw: Perspectivesfrom the Humanities, 6o J. COPYRIGHT SOc'YU.S.A. 387,
423-24 (2013).
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authors.' 0 Take, for example, the district court decision that held that a musical
arrangement of an earlier, sparsely notated lead sheet lacked sufficient originality
because "there must be present more than mere cocktail pianist variations of the
piece that are standard fare in the music trade by any competent musician.""
The notion that protection should depend on outperforming merely "competent"
peers in the field sounds much like patent's nonobviousness test but nothing like
the usual copyright standard." Still, on appeal the Second Circuit blessed that
formulation.1 3 Another judge subsequently employed it as the governing rule in
the recent, high-profile litigation over the copyright status of the song We Shall
Overcome.' 4
One could understandably brand these examples outliers. And certainly,
many commentators do.' 5 Yet these high-originality cases have a pedigree that
is both lengthy and largely unrecognized. The proposition that copyright
originality should require patent-style inventiveness beyond the everyday
creations of artisans in the field dates back to Justice Samuel Nelson's 1850
opinion in one of the first reported music infringement cases in the United States,
Jollie v. Jaques.16 In fact, only four months later, Nelson himself would author

the Supreme Court patent case that is now credited as the touchstone for patent
law's own nonobviousness doctrine, Hotchkiss v. Greenwood. " His parallel
vision for copyright, though, came first.

If Nelson had had his way, both patent and copyright doctrine alike would
have denied protection to everyday craftsmen-"mechanic[s]," as he put it in the
era's typical parlance-and reserved it only for "genius[es]" who made a large
enough leap beyond the rest of the field.' 8 As extraordinary as that proposition
sounds when measured against copyright's traditional originality standard,

10. See discussion infra Part III.B.
11. Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev 'd in parton othergrounds,
6o F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
12.

See Justin Hughes, The PersonalityInterestofArtists andInventorsin IntellectualProperty,

16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 81, 123 (1998) (criticizing the district court's use of a patent-like standard
that "would be disconcerting to almost any other class of beneficiaries of copyright law").
13.
Woods, 6o F. 3d at 991 (concluding that the district court had "articulated the correct standard
of originality").
14. See We Shall Overcome Found. v. Richmond Org., Inc., No. 16cv2725, 2017 WL 3981311, at
*13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2017).
15. See, e.g., 2 WILLLAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:53, Westlaw (database updated
Mar. 2021) (discussing the confusion arising from Woods, which "came perilously close to the patent
novelty standard"); Jeffrey Brandstetter, The Lone Arranger: Have the Courts Unfairly Singled Out
Musical Arrangements by Denying Them Protection as Derivative Works?, ENT. & SPORTS LAW.,
Spring 1997, at 1, 18-19 (questioning if the Woods court was in reality applying a standard more
appropriate for patents than for copyrights); Robert A. Gorman, Copyright Courts and Aesthetic
Judgments: Abuse or Necessity?, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS I, 7 (2001) (criticizing Woods for its
"seemingly patent-like creativity standard"); Hughes, supra note 12.
16.
13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437).
17. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
18. Jollie, 13 F. Cas. at 913-14.
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Nelson's opinion in Jollie initiated a small but significant line of cases seemingly
defying that standard up through the present day.
These cases have something curious in common: they're all about musical
arrangements. Explicitly or implicitly, each treats music differently than literary
works, sometimes even declaring that music is more analogous to patentable
inventions than to other copyrightable subject matter. Nelson's copyright legacy
thus hasn't been the baseline protectability threshold that he originally
articulated. Instead, it's been a mechanism through which later courts could
selectively raise that threshold when they encountered musical subject matter.
Drawing on original archival research, this Article identifies that forgotten
legacy. Jollie's heightened threshold is originality's other path, much less trod
than the familiar one but with a doctrinal story of its own to tell. I trace that path
from its start in 1850 to its most recent section in 2017.

After a nutshell summary of each regime's early history in Part I below, I
turn in Part II to a detailed study of the disputes that culminated in the Jollie
decision on the one hand and the Hotchkiss decision on the other. Part III
describes the trajectory that each body of law has since taken, focusing
particularly on the several music cases that have tried to apply Jollie's
heightened creativity threshold, even as the rest of copyright law had seemingly
left it behind. Many of these cases might have ended up quite differently without
the supporting roles played by individuals with idiosyncratic backgrounds, from
a music publisher-turned-inventor to a composer-turned-lawyer to a judgeturned-composer.
Beyond the personalities involved, though, I argue in Part IV that this
history offers three important lessons for contemporary copyright theory. First,
it provides an unlikely but powerful example in support of the Supreme Court's
proposition that copyright and patent doctrine have indeed cross-pollinated.
After all, the nonobviousness element that is today called "the heart of patent
law"' 9 and "the final gatekeeper of the patent system" 20 was, at its start, seen as
a viable addition to both copyright and patent law alike.
Second, this history suggests some proof of concept for how judges can
tailor seemingly monolithic copyright standards to particular subject matter's
idiosyncratic needs. IP commentators have frequently noted that a single set of
uniform rights is ill-suited to govern a world in which the affected industries and
creative fields can vary wildly in their production costs, norms, risk tolerances,
and so on. 21 Copyright's dalliance with a nonobviousness-type originality

19.
Speech of the Honorable Paul R. Michel Given to the New Jersey Intellectual Property Law
Association, in 9 FED. CIR. BAR J. 139, 143 (1999).
20.

Robert P. Merges, CommercialSuccess and PatentStandards: Economic Perspectiveson

Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803, 812 (1988).
21. See, e.g., Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in PatentLaw, 89 VA. L. REV.
1575, 1577 (2003); Michael W. Carroll, One for All: The Problem of Uniformity Cost in Intellectual
PropertyLaw, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 845, 846-50 (2006).
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threshold for musical derivatives shows judges' capacity to reduce that
uniformity by applying a supposedly homogeneous standard in heterogeneous

ways depending on the nature of the dispute.
Finally, courts' selective application of the higher creativity threshold for
musical works demonstrates how supposedly vestigial precedents can reemerge
in unpredictable and contingent ways. Even as Nelson's vision for patents took
over that entire body of law, judges spent six decades all but ignoring his
simultaneous vision for copyrights. From the vantage point of a turn-of-thecentury observer, the Jollie standard had been dead on arrival. In fact, that
standard might never have appeared again but for the litigation strategy of one
defendant-who happened to have both legal and musical training-in an
infringement case from 1914, over half a century after Jollie was decided. 22 This
episode of copyright history shows, in short, the messiness of doctrinal evolution
through the common-law process.
I.
COPYRIGHT AND PATENT PROTECTION IN THE EARLY NINETEENTH CENTURY

Copyrights and patents are each intended to promote their own form of
innovation through the grant of their own form of exclusivity. 23 Copyrights

cover works of authorship like books, music, and movies, while patents cover
functional inventions like pharmaceuticals, smartphone components, and
manufacturing methods. The same clause in the Constitution empowers
Congress to legislate in both spheres in order to "promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts."24 Most commentators understand that power to be justified by
the likelihood that informational goods, whether authorial or technological,
would be undersupplied if imitators could easily swoop into the market and
undercut the originator without having to bear the same fixed costs of creation.25
A patent's or copyright's exclusivity thus provides an appropriability mechanism

that can encourage investment in creative activity that might not otherwise take
place.
But before handing out that exclusivity, each regime needs to identify
what's worth protecting. One of the main screening tools available is a creativity
threshold, a bar of ingenuity over which authors or inventors must leap to obtain

22. See Cooper v. James, 213 F. 871(N.D. Ga. 1914). I discuss Cooperbelow in Part III.B.
23. See, e.g., Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. Holding, Inc., 696 F.3d 206,
216 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that both the copyright and patent systems "seek to encourage innovation");
Carroll, supra note 21, at 846 ("The law grants patents to inventors and copyrights to authors to
encourage investments in technological and cultural innovation.").
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) ("The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the
conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public
welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."').
25. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Economics ofImprovement in IntellectualPropertyLaw, 75
TEX. L. REV. 989, 994 (1997).
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the legal entitlement.26 Copyright screens through its originality requirement,2
patent law through its nonobviousness requirement. 28

The two doctrines are often discussed side by side, not only because they
perform a similar role but also because they perform it so differently. 29 For
patents, only the unconventional need apply. Even an entirely novel invention
will be denied a patent if the differences between it and what came before "would
have been obvious . . . to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the

claimed invention pertains." 30 In practice, according to the Court's most recent
exploration of the standard in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., "a court

must ask whether the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art
elements according to their established functions." 3 ' KSR further emphasized
that some activity may be creative but would nevertheless fall within the statute's
"ordinary skill" zone. "A person of ordinary skill," it said, "is also a person of
ordinary creativity, not an automaton. "32

For copyrights, by contrast, the Court has set a bar that's famously easy to
clear. In its 1991 decision Feist Publications,Inc. v. Rural Telephone Services

Co., the Court declared that "the requisite level of creativity is extremely low;
even a slight amount will suffice." 33 Unlike the technological inventions that
patent law seeks to encourage, expressive works need not be especially
surprising or clever to earn copyright protection. In fact, the Court all but
excluded nonobviousness from the copyright equation when it stated that "[t]he
vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative
spark, 'no matter how . . obvious' it might be." 34 Unlike patent law, as one
court of appeals summarized the difference, copyright "does not require
substantial originality" but instead "only enough originality to enable a work to
be distinguished from similar works that are in the public domain." 35 That's
generally not a tall order. In John Duffy's colorful example, a ten-year-old who

26. See, e.g., Buccafusco et al., supra note 6, at 1926-31 (discussing originality and
nonobviousness as creativity thresholds); Gregory N. Mandel, The Public Perception of Intellectual
Property, 66 FLA. L. REV. 261, 281 (2014).
27. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (requiring copyrightable works of authorship to be "original").
28. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (withholding patentability "if the differences between the claimed
invention and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which the claimed invention pertains").
29. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, § 2.2.1.1; Buccafusco et al., supra note 6, at 1926-31;
Fromer, supra note 8, at 1483-1508.
30. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
31. 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
32. Id at 421; see also id at 420 ("[I]n many cases a person of ordinary skill will be able to fit
the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle.").
33. 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
34. Id
35. Assessment Techs., LLC v. WIREdata, Inc., 350 F.3d 640,643 (7th Cir. 2003).
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spends an hour on a homework assignment by writing a trite and mediocre story
that earns a bad grade has probably still earned a copyright to go with it. 36
Especially given contemporary copyright doctrine's renunciation of any

similar validity demands, commentators often point to nonobviousness as the
feature that gives patent law its unique doctrinal identity within the IP domain. 37
It has famously been called "the heart of our patent system" and its "final
gatekeeper." 38 Among all patent validity elements, it is the only one that "fully
implements the core notion of patent law that patents should be granted only for
significant advances over previously known technology." 39 One 1998 study
found that, among patent validity issues, it was both the most frequently litigated
and the most likely to lead to an invalidity judgment. 40
Though Congress only codified this defining feature in 1952, the Supreme
Court has traced it back a century earlier to its 1851 decision in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood.41 In the Court's view, the statutory nonobviousness requirement

"was intended merely as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the
Hotchkiss condition, with congressional directions that inquiries into the
obviousness of the subject matter sought to be patented are a prerequisite to
patentability." 42 Hotchkiss, not any particular act of Congress, had first
established "the condition that a patentable invention evidence more ingenuity
and skill than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the
business." 43
But the Court's decision in Hotchkiss, it turns out, wasn't the first judicial

opinion to hold squarely that the availability of IP protection should depend on
outshining the everyday output of one's peers. Only a few months earlier, in the
fall of 1850, there was another. Justice Samuel Nelson, the same judge who
authored the Hotchkiss majority opinion, issued a trial-court decision while
riding circuit that announced a remarkably similar standard, one that required
creators to surpass that "which any person of ordinary skill and experience in
[the field] could have made. 44 That standard, however, was not for patents. It
was for copyrights.

To appreciate the significance of Nelson's intervention, one first needs to
understand that copyrights and patents were far more similar in the early

36.

John F. Duffy, Inventing Invention: A Case Study ofLegal Innovation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1, 7

(2007).
37. See, e.g., Michel, supra note 19.
38. See Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking PatentLaw 's Uniformity Principle,ii
NW. U. L. REV. 1619, 1658 (2007).
39. Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5,
KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350).
40. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, EmpiricalEvidence on the Validity ofLitigatedPatents,
26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 208-09 (1998).
41. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
42. Grahamv. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
43. Id. at 11.
44. Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910, 914 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437).
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nineteenth century than they are today.45 Thanks to parallel strands of cases
pioneered by Justice Joseph Story, early IP law's most influential jurist, neither
demanded any special ingenuity. The remainder of this Section briefly reviews
these cases, setting the stage for Nelson's double shakeup that follows in Part II.
A.

The Origins of Copyright's OriginalityStandard

'

When the First Congress passed the United States' inaugural Copyright Act
in 1790, originality didn't yet exist as a limitation on copyrightability. Any text
that fell into an appropriate class of subject matter-books, maps, or chartssufficed, so long as its author was a U.S. citizen or resident. As Oren Bracha
summarized the history of this period, "At its infancy American copyright law
did not include a lax originality threshold. It included no doctrine or concept of
this kind at all." 46
In two seminal cases, however, Story simultaneously introduced the new
requirement, while also ensuring that it wouldn't be onerous to satisfy. First, in
Gray v. Russell,47 he rejected an infringement defense arguing that the copied
work wasn't "substantially new," and thus simply too derivative to merit
protection. 48 The work at issue was a compilation of editorial notes and revisions
to a preexisting Latin textbook. To be sure, Story wrote, the putative author who
brings the claim must invest some intellectual labor in the work. 49 No one could
secure a copyright on that which had been copied outright from another. But
whether that labor yielded something "substantially" new was irrelevant. Rather,
the real question presented was whether the revisions "are to be found collected
and embodied in any former single work." 50 Because they were not, the defense
failed. Story conceded that other editors might perhaps arrive at a similar result
if they were to work on the problem independently. Yet the likelihood of such
convergence, he held, is no bar to copyright:
There is no foundation in law for the argument, that because the same
sources of information are open to all persons, and by the exercise of
their own industry and talents and skill, they could, from all these
sources, have produced a similar work, one party may at second hand,
without any exercise of industry, talents, or skill, borrow from another
all the materials, which have been accumulated and combined together
by him. 5

45. See, e.g., Mark P. McKenna & Katherine J. Strandburg, Progress and Competition in
Design, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. i, 33 (2013) ("[T]he patent and copyright standards imposed similarly
low thresholds for protection during th[e] pre-Hotchkissperiod.").
46. OREN BRACHA, OWNING IDEAS: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 1790-1909, at 65 (2016).

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

ic F. Cas. 1035 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5,728).
Id at 1037.
Id
Id
Id at 1038.
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Six years later, a second dispute over copying a textbook gave Story an
opportunity to expound further on just how minimal the originality threshold
was. In Emerson v. Davies,5 2 the defendant tried an argument similar to the one

that had failed in Gray, that the plaintiff's material wasn't "new, or invented by
him." 5 3 Story's reaction was, as before, so what if it wasn't? Authors of
arrangements and combinations of preexisting materials are perfectly entitled to
a copyright so long as "it be new and original in its substance." 54 In a move that

reflected his already-developed jurisprudence on patentability's similarly low
bar,55 Story reasoned that copyrights ought to demand no more of an intellectual
leap than do patents. 56
Story then waxed philosophical-and decidedly anti-romantic-on the
inherently cumulative, incremental, and derivative nature of literary production:

"In truth, in literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any,
things, which, in an abstract sense, are strictly new and original throughout.
Every book in literature, science and art, borrows, and must necessarily borrow,
and use much which was well known and used before." 57 To demand otherwise
as a condition of copyrightability would, he reasoned, be folly. Such an argument
would prove far too much, leaving "no ground for any copy-right in modern

times, and we should be obliged to ascend very high, even in antiquity, to find a
work entitled to such eminence." 5 8
In Story's hands, then, originality emerged as a requirement of intellectual
labor, not any particular yardstick of ingenuity or artistic merit. All that was
required to pass the test was producing a work by exercising one's "own skill,
judgment and labor," and "not merely copy[ing] that of another." 59 Shortly
thereafter, George Ticknor Curtis included that standard in the section of his
influential copyright treatise devoted to the issue of "the originality necessary to
a valid copyright."

60

Citing Emerson, Curtis wrote that the fledgling originality

element turned only on whether the author had "actually produced anything of
his own, and not whether his production [was] better or worse than the
productions of others." 61 Moreover, "[t]he law [did] not require that the subject
of a book should be new." 62 It required only that the book "contain[] any

52.
53.
54.

8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4,436).
Id at 620.
Id at 619.

55.

See infra Part I.B.

56. See Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 619 ("A man who constructs a new machine, is entitled to a patent
therefor, if the combination and arrangements thereof are new and his own invention, although he uses
old materials and old mechanical apparatus and powers in constructing such machine.").
57. Id
58. Id
59. Id
60.

GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT 169 (1847).

61.
62.

Id at 173.
Id
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substantive product of his own labor." 63 This version of originality, which by the
mid-nineteenth century seemed to represent the legal mainstream, was
deliberately modest. It was essentially a no-copying regime, eschewing any
interest in the author's talents or competence on display. In that sense, Story's
originality doctrine began as a way to preempt any notion that copyright law

might care where an author's work stood in relation to that of their peers. 64
B.

The Invention of Patent'sInvention Standard

Early American patent statutes didn't expressly indicate that a novel
invention should be denied a patent for want of inventiveness. The first Patent
Act, passed in 1790, at least required patentable inventions to be
"sufficiently . . . important," 65 but that language lasted only three years before

Congress overhauled the entire statute. 66 No court ever considered what the
requirement meant for patentability. 67 Thomas Jefferson, who as Secretary of
State voted on patent applications under that short-lived act, drafted a bill in 1791
that parenthetically noted a defendant should be permitted to show that the
invention-in-suit was "so unimportant and obvious that it ought not to be the

subject of an exclusive right." 68 Given his choice of words, some modern
commentators credit Jefferson as an early proponent of raising patent law's
ingenuity threshold.69 That bill, however, never passed and, though the record is
murky, might never have been introduced in Congress at all.70 His draft doesn't

63. Id at 173-74.
64. See BRACHA, supra note 46, at 70 ("[T]he moment that originality passed from the realm of
abstract ideology into doctrinal discourse it was dramatically scaled down. The heroic notion of the
author as a creator of radically new ideas ex nihilo had transformed into the thin requirement that he
must not be a servile copier.").
65. Act of Apr. 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (repealed 1793).
66. Duffy, supranote 36, at 34.
67. See id Congress included the same language again in the Patent Act of 1836 as an eligibility
condition to be applied by the newly established Patent Office in examining patent applications. Patent
Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 6, 5 Stat. 117, 119. Again, however, there's no record of the Office ever denying a
patent on that ground. See Edward C. Walterscheid, Novelty & the Hotchkiss Standard, 20 FED. CIR.
BAR J. 219, 234 (2010). No court would connect this provision to an inventiveness requirement until
Reckendorfer v. Faber,92 U.S. 347 (1875), over two decades afterHotchkiss was decided. Walterscheid,
supra, at 235-36; see also Giles S. Rich, PrinciplesofPatentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 398
(1960) (criticizing the "sufficiently . . important" language in the 1836 Act as "disused and moribund").
68. Thomas Jefferson, Draft of a Bill to Promote the Progress of the Useful Arts (Feb. 7, 1791),
in 5 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1788-1792, at 278, 278-80 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., New
York, G.P. Putnam's Sons 1895) (emphasis added).
69. See, e.g., Joseph Scott Miller, Nonobviousness: Looking Back and Looking Ahead, in 2
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH

i,

5 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) (arguing that

Jefferson "recognized the importance of threshing nonobvious grains of important invention from the
obvious chaff of routine, ordinary invention"); Duffy, supra note 36, at 35 & n.140 (listing other
examples of those who consider Jefferson's bill to be "a very early forerunner of the modem
nonobviousness requirement").
70. See Miller, supranote 69, at 5; Walterscheid, supra note 67, at 238-39.
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appear to have had much of an effect on his contemporaries. 7 1Perhaps Jefferson
was ahead of his time. It would take several decades before courts would begin
warming to such a restriction on patentability.
Indeed, the first patent case to address what we'd today call a
nonobviousness requirement was a vehement rejection of the proposition that
any such requirement exists. 7 2 As in copyright, Story led the way. The 1825 case
of Earle v. Sawyer presented the question of whether one could patent an
improvement to a shingle mill by substituting a circular saw for the reciprocating
saw that such machines had historically featured. 73 The patentee, who also
happened to be the inventor of the previous-generation shingle mill, accused the
defendant of infringing the updated version. At trial, the defendant put on
testimony showing that the substitution of one saw for another "was so obvious
to mechanics, that one of ordinary skill, upon the suggestion being made to him,
could scarcely fail to apply it in the mode which the plaintiff had applied his."7 4
The jury nevertheless returned a verdict of infringement. 75
In seeking a new trial, the defendant argued that the patentee's addition of
a circular saw to the existing shingle-mill apparatus was "so simple, that, though
new, it deserves not the name of an invention." 76 Obtaining a patent, he
contended, required not just a new and useful thing but also "mental labor and
intellectual creation." 77 A true invention ought to be something that "would not
occur to all persons skilled in the art, who wished to produce the same result." 78
Story disagreed. Patent law, he wrote, didn't care whether a new and useful
invention would have been obvious to mechanics or only to certifiable
geniuses-it would still be an invention either way:
It is of no consequence, whether the thing be simple or complicated;
whether it be by accident, or by long, laborious thought, or by an
instantaneous flash of mind, that it is first done. The law looks to the
fact, and not to the process by which it is accomplished. It gives the first
inventor, or discoverer of the thing, the exclusive right, and asks nothing
as to the mode or extent of the application of his genius to conceive or
execute it. 79

71. See Duffy, supra note 36, at 35-36 ("[D]espite the appearance of the word 'obvious,' the
provision has only slight significance in the development of the invention standard."). It is neither clear
whether Jefferson was really committed to this change nor, if he was, whether the inclusion of the word
"obvious" in an amended statute would have had much significance at the time. See id; Walterscheid,
supra note 67, at 238-39.
72. See Walterscheid, supra note 67, at 252 (dubbing Justice Story's opinion in Earle v. Sawyer
the "first known discussion" of obviousness in patent law).
73. 8 F. Cas. 254, 254 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247).
74. Id at 255.
75. Id
76. Id
77. Id
78. Id
79. Id at 256.
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Because Story considered patent doctrine indifferent to a particular
invention's level of ingenuity, he sustained the infringement verdict. Earle was

thus an emphatic disavowal of precisely the same sort of ordinary-skill filter
that's now familiar to modern patent practitioners.
That low threshold, like the analogous one that Story would erect for
copyright cases, "dominated the first half of the century," essentially defining
the early law of patentability. 80 Refusing to discriminate between high- and lowingenuity inventions, as Story had instructed, made some sense when everyday
laborers without any specialized, technical training were regularly developing
industrial innovations. 81 On top of that, there may have been less social need for
a rigorous screening process so long as the pace of technological change
remained slow enough. 82
Justice Levi Woodbury, who in 1845 was appointed to fill Story's seat on

the Court as Circuit Justice, repeatedly instructed juries that patents required no
heightened inventiveness. In Adams v. Edwards, for example, he stated that a
new and useful combination of old elements was patentable "no matter how
slight is the change."

83

Similarly, in Woodworth v. Edwards, he denied the

defense's request to instruct the jury that "if the mere changing [of the prior art]
were only such an alteration or addition as any mechanic of ordinary skill would
naturally make, then the mere change .

.

. was not the subject of a patent." 8 4

Consistent with this approach, Woodbury would later dissent stridently in the
Hotchkiss decision that started the erosion of Story's regime. 85

80. BRACHA, supra note 46, at 224; see also Kenneth J. Burchfiel, Revising the "Original"
Patent Clause: Pseudohistory in Constitutional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155, 189 (1989)
("With [Justice Story's] pronouncement, nonobviousness lapsed into obscurity, seldom again being
raised in reported cases until after Hotchkiss.").
81.
See B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION: PATENTS AND
COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920, at 90 (2005) (theorizing that Justice

Story's "commonsense standard was entirely appropriate for an era in which ordinary nontechnical
craftsmen and women could make valuable innovations based on simple know-how"); id at 116 (finding
evidence that, as late as 1870, "the technical skills and knowledge associated with occupational classes
such as machinists and metal workers/dealers were not at all necessary for patentable invention").
82. See Duffy, supra note 36, at 70-71; see also B. Zorina Khan, Property Rights and Patent
Litigation in Early Nineteenth-Century America, 55 J. ECON. HIST. 58, 70 (1995) (finding "a sharp
increase in invention and innovation" over the first half of the nineteenth century, where fewer than
i,ooo patents were issued in its first decade while almost 20,000 were granted in the 1850s).
83. 1F. Cas. 112, 113 (C.C.D. Mass. 1848) (No. 53).
84.

2 WRITINGS OF LEVI WOODBURY: POLITICAL, JUDICIAL, AND LITERARY 320 (Boston,

Little, Brown & Co. 1852). These jury instructions went unreported and were contained only in
Woodbury's collected writings. In refusing the requested instruction, Woodbury answered that the
invention was patentable so long as it "introduced a new principle, and answered a new end." Id The
"new principle" requirement was meant to avoid what courts at the time called "substantial identity"
between an invention and the prior art, whereby an earlier device that was the same in principle as a later
one could anticipate it even if small differences existed between them. See BRACHA, supra note 46, at
225. The Woodworth jury ultimately found for the plaintiff. A reported decision on an earlier temporary
injunction in the case can be found at Woodworth v. Edwards, 30 F. Cas. 567 (C.C.D. Me. 1847) (No.
18,014).

85.

See infra PartII.B.
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There were, to be sure, some initial cracks in Earle's edifice as the century
neared its halfway point. At least two cases in the 1840s were receptive to
considering ordinary mechanical skill when assessing an invention's novelty. 86
Confusingly, one of these decisions belonged to the otherwise Earle-compliant
Woodbury. 87 Even more insistent was Willard Phillips's 1837 patent treatise,
which posited a "general rule . . . that any change or modification of a machine

or other patentable subject, which would be obvious to every person acquainted
with the use of it, and which makes no material alteration in the mode and
principles of its operation, and by which no material addition is made, is not a
ground for claiming a patent."88 That proposition, of course, sounds a lot like the
modern nonobviousness test-and a lot like the one that Story had rejected in
Earle. Where Phillips found this supposedly already-established rule is unclear.
Congress had passed a new Patent Act only a year earlier, and the rule was
nowhere to be found within it.89 And while judges might have had room in the

normal common-law process to narrow the doctrinal concept of invention, the
leading case had expressly repudiated that move. U.S. courts had not once
approved of the rule that Phillips had attributed to them. 90 As a result, some
contemporary commentators have accused Phillips of prescribing law under the
guise of describing it.91
In any event, notwithstanding Phillips's treatise, the factual issue of
whether particular inventions would have been obvious to ordinary mechanics
was not typically litigated in the decades following Earle.92 By the century's
midpoint, the notion that patent law imposed a separate ingenuity limitation on
top of the baseline novelty requirement was still largely out of bounds.
Nelson's majority opinion in Hotchkiss would plant the seed that would

eventually create that limitation. First, though, he would try to do the same thing
for copyright law.

86. See Hovey v. Stevens, 12 F. Cas. 609, 612 (C.C.D. Mass. 1846) (No. 6,745); Many v. Jagger,
16 F. Cas. 677, 683 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1848) (No. 9,055).
87. See Hovey, 12 F. Cas. at 612 (allowing testimony that a change in form was "a very obvious
change to any mechanic").
88.

WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS 125-26 (Boston, Am.

Stationers' Co., 1837).
89. As discussed further below, see infra Part II.B, the previous Patent Act had contained a
provision that "simply changing the form or the proportions of any machine, or composition of matter,
in any degree, shall not be deemed a discovery." Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 2, 1 Stat. 318, 321 (repealed
1836). Congress repealed that provision when it passed the 1836 Act. Phillips concluded that because of
the "general rule" that he had identified, the impact of the statutory change was minimal. Duffy has
argued that Phillips actually "had his causation backwards," in that the judge-made rmle "grew out of the
express statutory exception, not the other way around." Duffy, supra note 36, at 38, 70.
90. See Walterscheid, supra note 67, at 254.
91. See, e.g., id. (suggesting that Phillips was "stating as fact that which he would have desired
to be fact").
92. See Burchfiel, supra note 8o, at 190.
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II.
JUSTICE NELSON'S HEIGHTENED THRESHOLDS

It's not surprising that early nineteenth-century defendants had tried, even
if unsuccessfully, to convince courts to distinguish between ostensibly genuine
creators on the one hand and ordinary mechanics on the other. Outside the
courtroom, whether in technological or literary innovation, many others were
doing the same thing.
Most technologists during this period were mechanics in a literal sense.
Their field of practice involved working with machines. 93 Branding someone a
"mechanic" was thus not so much descriptive as it was rhetorical, meant to
designate the purported inventor's labors as intellectually inferior. 94 It was, in
historian Alfred Young's characterization, a colonial-era "term of derision" used
against tradesmen "by those above them."

95

In 1807, a pro-patent association

known as the New England Association of Inventors and Patrons of Useful Arts
published a pamphlet proclaiming that the inventor is "highest in the scale of
useful beings," with the farmer and mechanic following behind him. 96 The
inventor was the one "to whom society is most indebted," not to mention the one
"from whom that same society wrest[s] his property without his consent" when
patent law fails to provide adequate protection. 97 Inventors, the creed declared,
sat on a more elevated plane than the rest.
Authors and artists, for their part, had in England begun to receive a similar
conceptual isolation from mechanics. Up through the first half of the eighteenth
century, authors had been considered their own form of craftsmen, skilled
operators of rhetorical and prosodic rules. 98 When their work surpassed that
expectation, audiences assumed that some external force-a divine muse,
perhaps-must have been responsible. 99 Later in that century, however, that
once-divine inspiration was reconceived as the romantic author's internal voice,
a voice possessed only by true geniuses. 00 At the same time, English authors
were growing concerned about the lower barriers to entry afforded by writing's
increasing commodification.' 0' In response, they began constructing themselves

as a professional literary class that stood apart from "mere [m]echanics" who

at 223.

93.

BRACHA, supra note 46,

94.
95.

See id
Alfred F. Young, Afterword: How Radical Was the American Revolution?, in BEYOND THE

AMERICAN REVOLUTION: EXPLORATIONS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN RADICALISM, 317, 331

(Alfred F. Young ed., 1993).
96. See Edward C. Walterscheid, Patentsand Manufacturingin the Early Republic, 8o J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 855, 887 (1998) (quoting NEWENGLAND [sic] ASSOCIATION OF INVENTORS
AND PATRONS OF USEFUL ART, REMARKS ON THE RIGHTS OF INVENTORS 8, 10 (Boston, 1807)).

97.

Id

98.
See Martha Woodmansee, The Geniusand the Copyright: Economic and Legal Conditions
of the Emergence of the Author,'17 EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 426-27 (1984).

99.
100.

Id at 427.
Id

101.

See MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS: THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 118-19 (1993).
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sought to emulate them. 102 Thus, for example, the poet Edward Young
contrasted the organic lifeform of original authorship with second-comers'
machine-like imitations: "An Original may be said to be of a vegetable nature; it
rises spontaneously from the vital root of Genius; it grows, it is not made:
Imitations are often a sort of Manufacture wrought up by those Mechanics, Art,
and Labour, out of pre-existent materials not their own." 103 Similarly, the
playwright Henry Fielding accused derivative writers of being "mere Mechanics,
to be envious and jealous of a Rival in their trade."1 04 Sir Joshua Reynolds told
the students of the Royal Academy of Art in 1770 that "intellectual
dignity . . enobles the Painter's art, that lays the line between him and the mere
mechanic."1 05 And according to an 1837 account, an unnamed author who
wanted to disparage the work of Alexander Pope called him "no poet, but a mere
mechanic, who gleaned thoughts from others."1 06
Against that cultural backdrop, one could understand how defense attorneys
might plausibly challenge works or inventions that seemed insufficiently
pathbreaking to merit the law's protection. With Story on the bench, that strategy
had failed. But Story died in 1845. Nelson, who had joined the Court the same
year,1 07 turned out to be far more receptive.
In the following two sections, I examine Jo/lie v. Jaques,108 in which

Nelson announced that copyright should indeed screen out the work of mere
mechanics, and then his more famous effort four months later in Hotchkiss v.
Greenwood109 that did the same for patents. Although the basics of their reported
decisions have long been known, many of the litigation details that I describe
here have not. They reveal a moment in jurisprudential time at the century's
midpoint when a heightened creativity threshold looked just as likely for
copyright law as it did for patent.

102.

Id

103.

EDWARD YOUNG, CONJECTURES ON ORIGINAL COMPOSITION IN A LETTER TO THE

AUTHOR OF SIR CHARLES GRANDISON 8-9 (Dublin, 1759). Benjamin Kaplan credits Young among the
"main protagonists" of "the evolution of Anglo-American doctrine about copyright." BENJAMIN
KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPYRIGHT 36-37 (1967); see also Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory

of Copyright: The Metamorphosesof "Authorship,"1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 467 (describing the influence
of Young's essay on English Romanticism and on the emergence of a concept of authorship that "has
given rise to important doctrinal structures in the law of copyright"); Charlene Avallone, "Vast and
VariedAccessions . . from Abroad": Herman Melville and EdwardYoung on Originality, in STUDIES
IN THE AMERICAN RENAISSANCE 409,410-11 (1984) (noting commentators' recognition of Young's
essay as "the single most important document on originality to come out of the early Romantic period
in England").
104. Henry Fielding, COVENT-GARDEN J., Jan. 4, 1752, at 1.
105.
SIR JOSHUA REYNOLDS, A DISCOURSE, DELIVERED TO THE STUDENTS OF THE ROYAL
ACADEMY, ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PRIZES, DECEMBER 14, 1770, BY THE PRESIDENT 4 (London,

Thomas Davies 1771).
106.
107.

R. P. GILLIES, RECOLLECTIONS OF SIR WALTER SCOTT 21 (London, James Fraser 1837).
See Jenni Parrish, Samuel Nelson, in BIOGRAPHICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SUPREME

COURT 378 (Melvin I. Urofsky ed., 2006).
108. 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437).
109. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
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Copyright:Mechanics Versus Authors

Nelson's 1850 circuit court opinion in Jollie is the case that best stands for
a stronger creativity threshold in U.S. copyright law. It was also the first
significant break from Story's prevailing low-originality standard. Curiously,
though, Story's decisions in Emerson and Gray seem never to have been
mentioned over the course of the litigation.
The case involved the work of composer George Loder. Loder had arranged
the incidental music for the dramatic comedy The Serious Family that was then

playing at a New York theater where he also served as music director. One of
the selections from that music was a polka number that came to be called
eponymously The Serious Family Polka. On February 15, 1850, Loder arranged

his theater version of the piece for piano. Three days later he then assigned his
interest in that arrangement to the music publisher Samuel C. Jollie." 0 Though
Jollie's name is now known primarily from the case caption of a copyright
dispute, he was also an inventor. (In fact, a few years later he would achieve
some minor fame in the annals of election transparency as the inventor of a
patented ballot box whose receptacle was a glass globe, ensuring that
"bystanders may see every ballot which is put in, see all the ballots that are in,
and see them when taken out.")"'1
Jollie published Loder's piano arrangement of the polka, reproduced in
Figure 1 below. Reflecting the historical meaning of the word "invention" that
covered both scientific and artistic novelty, Jollie's edition credited the
choreographer with "invent[ing]" the dance figures." 2 Jollie secured copyright
protection for the piece by depositing it with the district court on February 20.113
Loder's polka was based on an earlier German piece, The Roschen Polka." 4

110.
Complaint, in Transcript of Case File, at 1, 2-4, Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.
1850) (No. 7,437) (Equity Case No. 1/49) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration) [hereinafter Jollie Case File].
111. Ballot-Box, U.S. Patent No. 21,684, 11. 12-14 (filed Oct. 5, 1858). Jollie's ballot box
apparently was used in New York City elections but later gained wider visibility through depictions in
magazines like Harper'sand Leslie's. See Vanessa Meikle Schulman, Visualizing Race at the Polling
Place, 33 AM. ART 25, 40 (2019).
112. Complaint, in Jollie Case File, supra note 11o, at 1, 4. The final page of the edition provided
more information on the "invent[ions]" of the choreographer. Id.; Image 4 of the SeriousFamily Polka,
LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/resource/sm850.661500.o/?sp=4
[https://perma.cc/MRE5G8PW].
113. Jollie, 13 F. Cas. at 911. The deposit certificate was dated February 20, 1850. See Copyright
Certificate, in Jollie Case File, supra note 11o, at 13, 14. Under today's Copyright Act, protection begins
automatically at the moment of fixation in a tangible medium of expression. Under the Copyright Act
of 1831, however, no federal copyright subsisted in the work until the owner deposited a copy of it with
the clerk of the local district court. See Act of Feb. 8, 1831, ch. 16, § 4, 4 Stat. 436, 437 (repealed 1870).
114. Jollie, 13 F. Cas. at 911.
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According to Jollie, at least, Loder's adaptation required much "labor, time and
musical knowledge and skill."" 5

Fig. 1: Cover page to Samuel Jollie's sheet music for The Serious Family

Polka"1 6
Within days, the music publisher Jaques & Brother released a competing
piano edition of the polka." 7 When Jollie got wind of it, he approached John and
James Jaques, the partners who gave the publisher its name, and tried to convince
them to cease."1 8 They refused. While they admitted that they had been selling
sheet music under the same title as Jollie, they insisted that they had purchased
the rights to it from a third party and "had the music in process of publication
and the title page engraved before they knew or had heard of' Loder's version.119
On February 26, six days after he had secured the copyright on the piece,
Jollie sued in equity to enjoin the Jaques's continued distribution of the music. 2 0
The defendants argued that "the only similarity" between the two polkas lay "in
the melody," which had been "copied and taken from a composition by some
German called the Rdschen Polka and which ha[d] been performed by various
bands in this city" before Jollie had ever published his version.' 2' Loder, they
insisted, "has made no change in the melody whatever and has added no original

115.

Complaint, in Jollie Case File, supra note iio, at 1, 2.
116. The Serious Family Polka, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/item/sm185o.13056o/
[https://perma.cc/PG2X-KM9D]. The copy on file at the Library of Congress, which may be a slightly
later version, bears a handwritten entry stating that the deposit occurred in May, rather than February.
117. Complaint, in Jollie Case File, supra note iio, at 1, 6.
118. Id. at 8.
119. Answer, in Jollie Case File, supra note 11o, at 24, 25.
120. Docket Sheet, Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437) (Equity Case
No. 1/49) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, New York) [hereinafter
Jollie Docket Sheet].
121. Answer, inJollie Case File, supra note 11o, at 25.
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matter to the composition."1 22 Instead, he'd merely "adapted the old melody to
the Piano forte."1 23

In support, they used a now-familiar infringement litigation strategy that
was innovative for its day: expert witnesses. 2 4 First was a declaration from the
composer and music instructor George H. Curtis. Curtis opined that the parties'
two polkas were "different in their arrangement," that the defendants' "contains
several bars of matter" that the plaintiff's version lacked, and that multiple bars
between them differed in the arrangement of treble and bass notes. 25 Moreover,
Curtis continued, Jollie's polka had been "substantially copied in melody" from
the underlying German polka, "the only difference being that [the German work]
was arranged for the clarinet while the same [melody] appears in [Jollie's
version] arranged for the Pianoforte."1 26 In a passage that effectively invited the
court to assess the average musician's skill level, he argued that the change "is
not [attended] with the slightest difficulty & is susceptible of being accomplished
by any person able to transpose music in a very short space of time."

27

A second declaration came from Johann Munck, the composer and
bandleader, whose rendition of the polka the Jaques had advertised on their sheet
music, shown below in Figure 2. Like Curtis, Munck stated that "Loder has made
no change in the melody whatever and has added no original matter to the
composition and has made no new combination of the materials of said original
air but has merely adapted the old melody to the piano-forte." 128 Munck
explained that before the lawsuit, he had neither heard Loder's theatrical
performance nor seen Jollie's sheet music. Why, then, was his arrangement also
entitled The Serious Family Polka? According to Munck, it was because a clerk

in a music shop had asked him to arrange a piano version of a popular song he
had heard at a party. The clerk didn't know what it was called, only the name of
the theater at which it had been performed. After a failed attempt to get the clerk
to whistle the tune, Munck headed to the theater and asked the musicians there,
who identified the piece as the German Rtschen Polka. After learning that the
piece accompanied the production of The Serious Family, he and the store clerk
"jokingly baptized it 'The Serious Family Polka."'129 Although Munck couldn't
convince that particular store to buy the rights to his arrangement, eventually the
Jaques brothers did.1 30

122. Id. at 24, 25-26.
123. Id. at 26.
124. See PATRY, supra note 15, § 9:80 (callingJollie "[t]he earliest example of the use of expert
witnesses at the infringement stage I have found").
125. Affidavit of George H. Curtis, in Jollie Case File, supra note iio, at 19, 20.
126. Id. at 21.
127. Id at 21.
128. Johann Munck Affidavit, in Jollie Case File, supra note iio, at 55, 57.
129. Id at 6o.
130. Id at 59.
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Fig. 2: Cover page to the Jaques Brothers' sheet music for Serious Family
Polka131
On September 30, 1850,132 Nelson issued a decision deeply skeptical of the
plaintiff's claim. Perhaps reacting to the witness testimony that Loder's work
must have been easy to do, Nelson reasoned that copyright did not protect "slight
and unimportant variations, which any person of ordinary skill and experience

in music could have made." 133 A mere adaptation of an existing melody was
categorically insufficient, he wrote, because "[t]he original air requires genius
for its construction; but a mere mechanic in music . .. can make the adaptation
or accompaniment." 134 Original additions to, or adaptations of, preexisting
material didn't deserve protection so long as they were the kind that "a writer of

music with experience and skill might readily make." 135
Unable to determine as a factual matter whether the plaintiff's work met
that standard on the record before him, Nelson suspended decision on the
injunction motion and referred the matter to be tried before a jury ("direct[ed] an
issue at law" in the parlance of equity courts). 136 No further proceedings took
place, however. On December 11, the parties filed their consent to discontinue
the case.137

The Jollie theory that only works of romantic "genius" merit protection,

while quotidian products of everyday "mechanics" do not, was radical.
Anachronistically, of course, it looks nothing like modern copyright's "minimal
degree" standard for protectable creativity under Feist. More to the historical

131. Serious Family Polka, LIBR. OF CONG., https://www.loc.gv/item/sm1850.651930/
[https://perna.cc/2T8N-QFJS].
132. On the timing of the decision, see Jollie Docket Sheet, supra note 120.
133. Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910, 914 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,438).
134. Id at 913.
135. Id at 914.
136. Id
137. Jollie Docket Sheet, supra note 120.
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point, though, it also looks nothing like Story's vision of humdrum, incremental
originality that by that point had been percolating for over a decade. Jollie
represented a fundamentally different vision of copyrightable authorship.1'38
From what legal authority did Nelson draw this alternative vision?
According to the reported opinion, the defendants relied principally on a British
precedent from fifteen years earlier, D'Almaine v. Boosey.1 39 That case would

turn out to be all they needed. D'Almaine was the only authority on
copyrightability that Nelson cited.1 40 But in doing so, he made a larger doctrinal
leap than he let on. D 'Almaine wasn't a case about copyrightability thresholds at
all. It was, instead, about the scope of the fair abridgement defense to an
infringement claim (the precursor to the modern fair use doctrine).
The dispute in D 'Almaineconcerned a music publisher that had rearranged
arias from the 1834 opera Lestocq as instrumental dance music.141 When the
rights owner sued, the defendant invoked the fair abridgment doctrine that
immunized otherwise-infringing copies because, as an earlier case put it, "the
invention, learning, and judgment of the [secondary] author is shewn in them."1 42
The D'Almaine case record reveals that many of the parties' filings focused on
the level of authorial skill necessary to execute a successful dance arrangement.
Two composers each submitted an affidavit on behalf of the defendant arguing
that the arrangements at issue required "a very considerable degree of musical
skill and talent," and that the commercial value of the music "is very much
increased or diminished by the talent and ability of the composer or arranger of
the said music so composed arranged altered or added to for the purpose of being
danced to."1 43 In an analogy straight out of the fair abridgment case law, the
witnesses characterized the defendant's arrangement as being so different from
the underlying arias as to be "equally as distinct as in the instance of two distinct
[treatises] upon one and the same subject by different authors in which each
Author in his own treatise uses the same [work] as his foundation or from which

138. See BRACHA, supra note 46, at 70-71 (calling Jollie "an alternative future for American
copyright law," where "copyright doctrine would be shaped to reflect the ideal that the essence of
intellectual ownership and its ultimate justification is authorship defined by strong originality").
139. (1835) 16o Eng. Rep. 117; 1 Y. & C. Ex. 288; see Jollie, 13 F. Cas. at 911 (reporting parties'
citations). The case file contains no record of the parties' legal arguments.
140. See Jollie, 13 F. Cas. at 913.
141. For a discussion of D 'Almaine'selevation of melody above all other musical elements, see
Joseph P. Fishman, Music as a Matter ofLaw, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1861, 1877-78 (2018).
142. Gyles v. Wilcox (1740) 26 Eng. Rep. 489, 490; 2 Atk. 141; see also Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F.
Cas. 342, 345 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) (citing Gyles for the proposition that, under U.S. law, an
abridgement was "fair" and noninfringing if it included "real, substantial condensation of the materials,
and intellectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon").
143. Affidavit of William Hawes, in Transcript of Case File, at 21, 21, D'Almaine v. Boosey
(1835) 16o Eng. Rep. 117 (No. E 103/73/xx) (on file with the National Archives of the United Kingdom)
[hereinafter D 'Almaine Case File]; see Affidavit of George Frederick Harris, in D 'Almaine Case File,
supra, at 25, 25-27. I thank Derek Miller for providing me with a copy of the court's records from the
U.K. National Archives.
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the author takes his lead but amplifies or enlarges or abridges and explains the
subject according to his own ideas."1 44
The plaintiff, meanwhile, countered with the affidavit of a music professor
who opined that "the melodies or airs are the substantial and essential portions
of an Opera and the most valuable and important parts thereof" 145 Opera
composer Henry Bishop (today probably best known for his song Home! Sweet
Home! 146 ) also weighed in to declare that composers were customarily
compensated not just for full-score reproductions but also for piano-voice
arrangements.1 47 The common denominator between the various editions was
the opera's melodies, which "constitute the parts of the music of operas most
material to the interest of purchasers of the copyright."1 48
The plaintiff's argument won. The Court of Exchequer held that the
rearrangement did not excuse copying the aria's tune, for "the subject of music
is to be regarded upon very different principles. It is the air or melody which is
the invention of the author, and which may in such case be the subject of
piracy."1 49 In the line that would inspire Nelson's reasoning in Jollie, the court
reasoned that melody is "that in which the whole meritorious part of the
invention consists .... The original air requires the aid of genius for its
construction, but a mere mechanic in music can make the adaptation or
accompaniment.""0
Jollie's mechanic/genius dichotomy thus came straight from D'Almaine's

assessment of the intellectual labor required for musical arrangements. But it
amplified that dichotomy in two ways. First, it grafted D'Almaine's holding-

which governed only what a copyist needed to do to avoid infringement-onto
the standard for what an author needed to do to secure protection in the first
instance.
Second, it took a principle that might have been limited to music
cases and seemingly stated it as a transsubstantive rule of copyrightability. On
its face, D'Almaine could be read narrowly to stand for the proposition that fair
abridgement doctrine works differently when the copied material consists of
melodic themes rather than literary ones.' 52 Indeed, three years before Jollie was
decided, that's precisely how Curtis's copyright treatise read it. It interpreted

144. Affidavit of George Frederick Harris, in D 'Almaine Case File, supra note 143, at 25, 27.
145. Affidavit of John Weippert, in D'Almaine Case File, supra note 143, at 38, 38.
146. Modem audiences may recognize the tune from the musical The King and I and the final
scene of the film The Wizard of Oz.
147. Affidavit of Henry Rowley Bishop, in D'Almaine Case File, supra note 143, at 40, 40.
148. Id at 42.
149. D'Almaine v. Boosey (1835) 16o Eng. Rep. 117, 123; 1Y. & C. Ex. 288, 302.
150. Id
151. See Robert Brauneis, The Transformationof Originalityin the Progressive-EraDebate over
Copyright in News, 27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 321, 337 n.89 (2009) ("Justice Nelson adapted the
'mere mechanic' language for different purposes [thanD 'Almaine'sfair abridgement standard], as a test
of whether a work of authorship could be copyrighted .... ").
152. See D'Almaine, 16o Eng. Rep. at 121 ("This is not like the case of an abridgment of a book.
The purpose of abridgments is very distinct from that of the works from which they are taken.").
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D'Almaine as distinguishing between books, where the court "apparently
recognize[d] the right of making an abridgment of some kind," and musical
compositions, where it did not.' 5 3 Curtis treated D'Almaine as erecting a form of
music exceptionalism based on the premise that music lacks the sort of common
stock of ideas that literature possesses:
The distinction which [the D 'Almaine court] makes between music and
a literary composition seems to be merely that an air or melody in music
is the pure invention of the author, and there is no ground of a common
subject for a subsequent composer to fall back upon; whereas, in
literature, although the particular composition is original, and
exclusively the fruit of the author's mind, the subject is common to all
men, and may admit of distinctions between the modes of treating it,
which music will not admit of.'

Jollie appears to go further. It proposes that the work of a "mere mechanic"
simply doesn't deserve protection, and that the best way to identify those
mechanics is to inquire into the average level of skill within the field of practice.
Music isn't the exception; it's the test case for a broader rule. Taken seriously,
then, Jollie would require that authors seeking copyright protection would
always need to show that their work surpassed whatever the author's peers "with
experience and skill might readily make." 55
B.

Patent:Mechanics Versus Inventors

The ordinary mechanic would again play the foil to the romantic creator in
Nelson's companion decision on patentable invention. The patent at issue was
granted in 1841 to coinventors John Hotchkiss, John Davenport, and John

Quincy for a new type of doorknob.1 56 The point of novelty was an improvement
in the material out of which the knobs were made. Whereas existing models had
been made out of metal or wood, their patent covered "making said knobs of
potters' clay, such as is used in any species of pottery-also of porcelain."1

153.
154.
155.
156.
Patent No.
157.

CuRTIs, supra note 6o, at 280-81.
Id at 284-85.
Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910, 914 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437).
Making Door and Other Knobs of All Kinds of Clay Used in Pottery and of Porcelain, U.S.
2,197 (filed July 29, 1841).
Id at 11. 12-14.
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Fig. 3: Drawings of the knobs from the Hotchkiss Patent (1841)
Had this patent issued under the Patent Act that had governed up through
1835, it would have had a fatal flaw. That version of the statute had contained a
provision stating that "simply changing the form or the proportions of any
machine, or composition of matter, in any degree, shall not be deemed a
discovery." 151 Under the standard that courts had fashioned to apply that
provision, swapping in clay for metal or wood wouldn't have been patentable
unless, by making that swap, "a new effect is produced" whereby "there is not
simply a change of form and proportion, but a change of principle also." 159
Congress repealed that limitation, however, when it passed a revised Act in 1836.
As a statutory matter, at least, it seemed in 1841 that the Hotchkiss patent was
valid so long as the doorknob was indeed new and useful.
In 1845, the executrix of Hotchkiss's estate and the other coinventors sued
the major Cincinnati industrialist (and soon-to-be Union arms manufacturer)
Miles Greenwood, along with his business partner, for infringing the patented

knob. 160 Greenwood's firmh was at that time a major iron foundry that supplied
hardware items to thousands of homes from Cincinnati westward. 161 The record
does not specify what specifically the defendants had done to attract the

Patent Act of 1793, ch. ii, § 2, 1 Star. 318, 321 (repealed 1836).
Davis v. Palmer, 7 F. Cas.4
154, 159 (Marshall, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Va. 1827) (No. 3,645).
For more on Greenwood, see Carl M. Becker, Miles Greenwood, in FOR THE UNION: OHIO
LEADERS IN THE CIVIL WAR 259 (Kenneth W. Wheeler ed., 1998). Though not relevant to the litigation,
Greenwood himself happens to have been the assignee of a patent covering a different door part, a
combined latch, and lock. See Gravitating Combined Latch and Lock for Doors, U. S. Patent No. 2,621
(filed May 12, 1842). Not to be outdone, Hotchkiss had a lock patent, too. See Latch, U. S. Patent No.
891oX (filed June 19, 1835).
161. See Becker, supra note 16o, at 267. Greenwood's operation was "the largest ironmanufacturing concerm in the West in 1850" and the largest private employer in the city. Id at 268.
158.
159.
160.
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patentees' ire. But Greenwood, dubbed by a contemporary biographer the
"Tubal-cain of the West,"1 62 at least must have provided a big target.
The dispute attracted major legal talent. Initially representing the plaintiffs
was Alphonso Taft, who in the 1870s would become the U.S. Secretary of War
and then Attorney General. Of particular note to legal historians of intellectual
property, he also later represented the defendant in Baker v. Selden, 163 a
canonical case on the proper distinction between copyright and patent law.1 64
For unknown reasons, Taft's firm at some point appears to have dropped out of

the case. For the duration of the case, the plaintiffs were represented by a "T.
Ewing," possibly fellow Ohioan Thomas Ewing, who had served in the U.S.
Senate in the 1830s and had reputedly helped draft the Patent Act of 1836.165
The defendants first retained Charles Fox, who would later become a
Cincinnati Superior Court Judge.1 66 At some point before trial, he was joined by
Salmon P. Chase, the future Chief Justice of the United States.1 67 Chase took on
a number of patent clients during this period, including the defendant in the
celebrated and doctrinally foundational case that invalidated part of Samuel
Morse's telegraph patent.1 68 When the Hotchkiss case eventually made its way
to the Supreme Court, it was Chase who delivered the oral argument.1 69

During the course of the litigation, Greenwood was elected President of the
Ohio Mechanics' Institute. 170 As a card-carrying mechanic himself, it's perhaps
162. Id at 269.
163. 1ci U.S. 99 (1880).
164. See Pamela Samuelson, The Story ofBaker v. Selden- Sharpening the DistinctionBetween
Authorshipand Invention, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES 159, 175 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle
Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2006).
165. See BiographicalSketches of the CommissionersofPatents, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 145, 20002 (1936).
166.

See LEWIS M. HOSEA, CINCINNATI SUPERIOR COURT DECISIONS, at i (1907) (listing Fox as

a judge from 1863 to 1868).
167.
So far as I'm aware, Salmon Chase has not been previously identified as Greenwood's
counsel. The reported Circuit Court opinion lists "Fox and Chase" appearing for the defendants,
Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 12 F. Cas. 551, 551 (C.C.D. Ohio 1848) (No. 6,718), and the Supreme Court
opinion lists "Mr. Chase" as the lawyer arguing the case, Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (ii How.)
248, 253 (1851). The Supreme Court's case record, meanwhile, contains a lawyer's handwritten notes
signed "S.P. Chase." Letter from S.P. Chase, in Transcript of Case File at 7, 7, Hotchkiss v. Greenwood,
52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851) (No. 2,732) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration, Washington, D.C.) [hereinafterHotchkiss Case File].
168. O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1854). See 1 THE SALMON P. CHASE PAPERS 214
& n.41 (John Niven ed., 1993) (reprinting Chase's journal entries from 1849 discussing his representation
of Morse). Chase's oral argument before the Court in the Morse case was widely reported. See Invention
of the Electric Telegraph The Great Telegraph Case in the Supreme Court of the UnitedStates, N.Y.

TIMES
(Feb.
2,
1853),
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1853/02/02/297744692.htm?pageNumber=6
[https://perma.cc/ZU24-A578].
169. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 253.
170. See OHIO MECHANICS' INSTITUTE, 1828-1878, at 83 (Cincinnati, Wilstach, Baldwin & Co.
1878). The Institute was a technical school that would eventually be folded into the University of
Cincinnati.
See
Ohio
Mechanics
Institute,
OHIO
HIST.
CENT.,
https://ohiohistorycentral.org/w/OhioMechanics Institute [https://perma.cc/H57W-USPQ].
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fitting that Greenwood's defense entirely avoided the "even a mechanic could
do it" theory that some other litigants had tried in the 1840s. Instead, the defense
was singularly focused on showing that the patentee's simple substitution of clay
for other materials was already anticipated in the prior art. They told the court in
1847 that they had found uses of such knobs in New York, Albany, Philadelphia,
and other northeast cities "long before" the patentees' asserted date of
invention.' 7 ' Moreover, they argued, the patentees themselves had known that
such knobs had been previously manufactured and sold abroad and "did not
believe themselves to be the first inventors."1 72 On the eve of trial the following
year, the defendants informed the court that they had unearthed even more
anticipating references in the prior art, cataloguing additional uses in Connecticut
and dating the public uses of clay and porcelain knobs as far back as 1831.173
Supreme Court Justice John McLean presided over a three-day jury trial in
Cincinnati in July 1848.174 After the close of evidence, the plaintiffs requested a
jury instruction stating that even if the physical form of their knob had been used
before, it remained patentable so long as it had never been attached to clay or
porcelain and implementing that attachment "required skill and thought and
invention." 7 5 If those conditions were satisfied, they contended, then the jury
must sustain the validity of any knob "better and cheaper" than the metal and
wooden knobs that came before it.1 76 But McLean refused. In fact, the plaintiffs'
strategy of highlighting the skill required to attach the knob's spindle and shank
to the clay material may have invited more trouble than they bargained for.177
The justice reasoned that such attachment may indeed require skill, but merely
the kind that "an individual acquainted with mechanics, only, can exercise."1 78

He therefore instructed the jury that if constructing the knob required "no other
ingenuity or skill . . than that of an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the
business, the patent is void and the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover."1 79

These jury instructions are puzzling several times over. First, why did
plaintiffs' counsel not raise Earle, which flatly disapproved of the court's
demotion of mechanical skill? 80 Why, for that matter, didn't McLean see any
171. Notice to Plaintiffs, in Transcript of Record at 6, 6, Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11
How.) 248 (1851) (No. 171) (filed Nov. 27, 1848) [hereinafterHotchkiss Transcript of Record].
172. Id
173. Id. at 7.
174. In 1847, Chase married a niece of McLean's wife. By the time of trial, then, the defendant's
lawyer had become the presiding judge's relative. Chase appeared frequently in McLean's courtroom,
however, and the relationship was apparently not an issue. See Paul Finkelman, JohnMcLean: Moderate
Abolitionistand Supreme Court Politician,62 VAND. L. REV. 519, 528-29 (2009).
175. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 12 F. Cas. 551, 552 (C.C.D. Ohio 1848) (No. 6,718).
176. Id
177. See Walterscheid, supra note 67, at 262 (surmising that McLean's sua sponte instruction on
ordinary mechanics might have been his way of responding to the plaintiffs' argument that "skill and
thought and invention" were needed to construct the claimed knob).
178. Hotchkiss, 12F. Cas. at 552.
179. Id at 553.
180. See Walterscheid, supra note 67, at 225.
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need to deal with it either? Why did his instructions ignore the clay knobs
allegedly in the prior art, which the defendants had devoted so much evidentiary
attention to, and which if proven might have obviated the entire inventiveness
issue?'' And most significantly, given the parties' singular focus on novelty,
why did McLean fashion this "ordinary mechanic" test sua sponte to begin
with? 182 Neither the case record nor McLean's judicial papers suggest any

answers. One can only speculate what the court might have done differently had
the plaintiffs invoked Story's precedent.
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court with a sparse assignment of
error declaring simply that the trial court had "erred in the instructions which
they gave to the jury." 8 3 The Court heard argument over two days in February
1851.184 According to the summary of the argument included in the reported
opinion, the plaintiff focused on the invention's novelty and utility, again never
citing Earle.8 5 Chase's argument for the defense didn't cite it either. 8 6 Instead,
it focused on substituting new materials and a then-existing doctrine barring
patents on new uses for old devices.1 87 He asked the Court incredulously if they
were really prepared to endorse a system that would allow someone to find the
rare object that hadn't yet been forged in cast-iron-a material that had already
been used to make "every thing whose shape can be impressed upon sand"-and
then "exclude all other persons from making the same article out of the same
material?"' 88 The argument didn't turn on anyone's ingenuity, nor did it ever
reference the trial court's "ordinary mechanic" standard.
On February 19, about four months after Nelson had issued his copyright
decision in Jollie, he ported over the same reasoning to patent law through the
Court's majority opinion affirming McLean's instructions. "[T]here was no
error," Nelson began, "for unless more ingenuity and skill . . . were required [to

apply the shank] to the clay or porcelain knob than were possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business, there was an absence of that degree of
skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention."189
These last two words, taken at face value at least, are crucially important. The
Court here seemed to announce an element baked into the concept of invention
itself, not (as might otherwise be supposed) just into the narrow category of

181. See id at 224.
182. See Id at 262.
183. Assignment of Error, in Hotchkiss Case File, supra note 167 at 4, 5.
184. Docket Sheet, Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (ii How.) 248 (1851) (No. 2732) (on file
with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.),
https://catalog.archives.gov/id/82590058 [https://penna.cc/GR8A-UD2J] (Image 565 of 995).
185. See Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 253-57 (1851).
186. See Id at 257-63.
187. See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standardson the ForefrontofPatentability,51 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 609, 633 (2009) (discussing the wide acceptance of this "double use" doctrine in the nineteenth
century and its eventual abrogation under the Patent Act of 1952).
188. Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. at 260.
189. Id at 267 (emphasis added).
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change-of-form cases where the patentee has simply substituted a new material
for an old one. Even a new and useful improvement is ineligible for a patent if it
is only "the work of the skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor."190 Like the
genius authors of Jollie, inventors were to be defined in negative relation to the
undifferentiated masses of mechanics.
Woodbury dissented. Consistent with his jury instructions in Adams and
Edwards, he accused the majority of instituting a patentability standard that "has
not the countenance of precedent, either English or American."191 He maintained
that "the skill necessary to construct" an invention "is an immaterial inquiry."1 92
Unlike every other Justice, he considered the issue settled by Story's decision in
Earle. He would have remanded the case for a new trial before a jury that was
properly instructed that, like Earle had held, "a combination, if simple and
obvious, yet if entirely new, is patentable."1 93 The majority never engaged that
precedent. It simply ignored it.

III.
THE TWO HEIGHTENED THRESHOLDS OVER TIME

Despite what in hindsight seems like a sudden doctrinal shakeup, neither
Hotchkiss for patents nor Jollie for copyrights had much of an immediate impact.

Each decision's influence took time to appear. Of course, the nonobviousness
regime into which Hotchkiss eventually snowballed dwarfs any copyright

change that could fairly be traced to Jollie. Nevertheless, as this Section argues,
Jollie's reverberations continued to be felt in multiple music cases across the
twentieth century.

I begin in Part III.A with a summary of the delayed but eventually
exponential growth of nonobviousness after Hotchkiss. As others have already
explored this transformation in depth, 194 my review here is brief. In Part III. B, I
then turn, in greater detail, to the comparatively understudied stamp that Jollie
has left within its own sphere.
A.

What Hotchkiss Did

On its face, Hotchkiss appeared to change patent doctrine immediately. It
embedded a new element in the concept of invention. It formally introduced
patent law's version of the reasonable person, the ordinary mechanic (eventually
to become known as the person having ordinary skill in the art), to the case

190. Id
191. Id at 270 (Woodbury, J., dissenting).
192. Id at 269.
193. Id (citing Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. Cas. 254, 254 (C.C.D. Mass. 1825) (No. 4,247)). Technically,
Woodbury here quoted from one of the published Earle opinion's headnotes, rather than Story's words
themselves.
194. See, e.g., Duffy, supranote 36; Walterscheid, supra note 67.
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law.1 95 And most fundamentally, it reoriented the validity test away from the
perspective of the businessman and toward that of the scientist.1 96
The case law didn't feel those effects right away, however. Some early
decisions seemed to march in lockstep,1 97 but most judges didn't do much with
the case until after the Civil War. 19 Though the twentieth-century Supreme
Court saw Hotchkiss as the wellspring of nonobviousness,1 99 antebellum judges
evidently did not. Even Nelson himself rejected a Hotchkiss-like defense at an
infringement trial later that same year. 200 A defendant accused of infringing a
patented improvement to a reaping machine argued that the improvement was

"so simple and obvious, that the claim, even admitting it to have been new and
not before in use, is not the subject of a patent." 201Nelson strangely brushed it
off, instructing the jury that "[n]ovelty and utility in the improvement seem to be
all that the statute requires as a condition to the granting of a patent." 202 Perhaps
Nelson hadn't truly meant to declare a rule governing all patents (though that's
precisely what he had done) and had instead intended a more limited rule only
for cases involving substitution of materials. 203
In any event, the broader reading of Hotchkiss as a general condition of
patentability picked up steam in the 1870s, at a time of growing commercial
anxiety over excessive patent litigation. 204 The Supreme Court in 1875's
Reckendorfer v. Faber gave an inventiveness threshold a full-throated

endorsement:
An instrument or manufacture which is the result of mechanical skill
merely is not patentable. Mechanical skill is one thing: invention is a
different thing. Perfection of workmanship, however much it may
increase the convenience, extend the use, or diminish expense, is not

195. See Walterscheid, supra note 67, at 260.
196. See BRACHA, supra note 46, at 227-28 ("[Nelson] shifted the [then-prevailing] focus of the
analysis from [the invention's] added value to the intellectual skill that he saw as the hallmark of true
invention .... The material point was not whether the new doorknob was better, but whether it could
be said to be the product of an inventor.").
197. See, e.g., Larabee v. Cortlan,14 F. Cas. 1136, 1138 (C.C.D. Md. 1851) (No. 8,084) (instructing
the jury that an improvement patent would be invalid if "a mechanic of ordinary skill and acquainted
with such business" could achieve the same result "with the old improvement before him").

198.

KHAN,

supra note 81, at 73 (showing that judges hardly ever cited Hotchkiss until the 1870s);

see also Walterscheid, supra note 67, at 263 ("The Hotchkiss standard only began to be treated as a
general condition' for patentability after the Civil War .... ").
199. See Grahamv. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
200. According to the synopsis of an opinion from a later stage in the litigation, the trial occurred
in June 1851, about four months after the Supreme Court's ruling in Hotchkiss. See McCormick v.
Seymour, 15 F. Cas. 1329, 1329 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1854) (No. 8,727).
201. McCormick v. Seymour, 15 F. Cas. 1322, 1323 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1851) (No. 8,726), rev'd in
part on other grounds, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 480 (1853).
202. Id
203. BRACHA, supra note 46, at 229 (offering this theory).
204. Bracha attributes this uptick in inventiveness jurisprudence to entrepreneurial railroadcompany defendants, which sought to stem the tide of lawsuits by convincing courts to make patents
harder to obtain. See Id at 229-30.
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patentable. The distinction between mechanical skill, with its
conveniences and advantages and inventive genius, is recognized in all
the cases. 205
In 1880, the Court followed up with its maxim in Pearce v. Mulford that

"all improvement is not invention." 206 To earn legal protection, the alleged
invention "must be the product of some exercise of the inventive faculties"
and "involve something more than what is obvious to persons skilled in the art
to which it relates." 207 Most significantly, in 1883's Atlantic Works v. Brady, the

Court cautioned that "[t]o grant to a single party a monopoly of every slight
advance made, except where the exercise of invention, somewhat above ordinary
mechanical or engineering skill, is distinctly shown, is unjust in principle and
injurious in its consequences." 208 It then poetically detailed those consequences,
supplying the Court's first theoretical justification of its newly expanding
inventiveness requirement:

The design of the patent laws is to reward those who make some
substantial discovery or invention, which adds to our knowledge and
makes a step in advance in the useful arts. Such inventors are worthy of
all favor. It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for
every trifling device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would
naturally and spontaneously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator
in the ordinary progress of manufactures. Such an indiscriminate
creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to obstruct than to stimulate
invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who make it their
business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its
foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a
heavy tax upon the industry of the country, without contributing

anything to the real advancement of the arts. It embarrasses the honest
pursuit of business with fears and apprehensions of concealed liens and
unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious accountings for profits
made in good faith.209
By the time William Robinson published his seminal patent treatise in
1890, the Hotchkiss division between invention and mechanical skill had fully
taken root. "Inventors," he wrote, meant only "those by whom creative skill and
genius have been exercised. It is the exercise of this creative skill alone which is
here recognized as an inventive act, and only the result of such an act, so far
perfected as to be available for public use, is an invention."2 10

92 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1876).
102 U.S. 112, 118 (1880).
Id
107 U.S. 192, 200 (1883).
Id
210.
WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS 104-05 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1890); see also id at 117 ("Industry in exploring the discoveries and acquiring the
ideas of others; wise judgment in selecting and combining them; mechanical skill in applying them to
practical results; none of these are creation, none of these enter into the inventive act.").
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
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Nonobviousness would take a circuitous road through the twentieth century
as courts, and eventually Congress, tried to pin down what exactly the concept
ought to be measuring. In 1941, the Court infamously raised the bar to the point
that even an invention requiring some "ingenuity" would still fall short if that
ingenuity amounted to "no more than that to be expected of a mechanic skilled
in the art." 211 The Court wanted to reserve patents for inventions that "reveal[ed]
the flash of creative genius." 2 12 But identifying which inventions displayed such
genius, as opposed to the incremental but still laborious advances through which
science typically progresses, proved to be a frustrating task. Judge Learned Hand

soon bemoaned this interpretation of Hotchkiss as requiring the search for
something "as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a phantom as exists in
the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts." 213 Congress abrogated that precedent
in 1952, when the newly enacted Patent Act finally took the search for "genius"
out of the standard and replaced it with the nonobviousness standard still found
today in § 103.214 I won't wade through the particulars of this more recent history
here, but by the time the Court got around to construing the statutory codification
of nonobviousness, it identified Hotchkiss as its source.2 1 5

B.

What Jollie Did

Unlike Hotchkiss, still cited by the Supreme Court and regularly taught in

law-school patent courses, Jollie isn't a household case name. Westlaw and
Lexis together tally only six judicial citations to Jollie since 1900 (though that
number is in fact underinclusive, as both services omit some important ones
discussed here). 216 Contemporary treatises have almost nothing to say about it.
Nimmer, for example, omits Jollie entirely. Goldstein's treatise cites it only
once, and not for anything to do with its radical originality standard but instead
for the banal

proposition that courts may

admit expert testimony on

originality. 217 Most nineteenth-century treatise writers gave Jollie similarly short

211. Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91-92 (1941).
212. Id. at 9.
213. Harries v. Air King Prods. Co., 183 F.2d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 1950).
214. See 35 U.S.C. § 103.
215.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966); KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398, 427 (2007) (stating that Hotchkiss "established" the now-codified "bar on patents claiming obvious
subject matter").
216. See Francescatti v. Germanotta, No. 11 CV 5270, 2014 WL 2767231, at *9 (N.D. Ill. June 17,
2014); Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 73 F. Supp. 165, 167 (S.D.N.Y. 1947); Norden
v. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp. 415, 417 (D. Mass. 1936); Fred Fisher, Inc. v. Dillingham, 298 F. 145,
148 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Underhill v. Schenck, 143 N.E. 773, 778 (N.Y. 1924); Glaser v. St. Elmo Co., 175
F. 276, 278 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909). As I discuss below, both services curiously omit what are arguably
Jollie's two most significant citations, Cooperv. James, 213 F. 871, 872 (N.D. Ga. 1914), in 1914 and
Woods v. Bourne Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev 'd inpart on othergrounds, 6o F.3d 978
(2d Cir. 1995), in 1994.
217. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, § 16.4.
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shrift. 218 Historians know Jollie as an anomaly, the exception that proves
copyright's rule of a low-creativity bar to protectability. 219
Yet Jollie in fact has a lot more to teach contemporary legal audiences than
appearances might let on. While it failed to raise the originality threshold for
most classes of subject matter, it nevertheless launched a line of cases that
silently raised that threshold when the dispute concerned musical
arrangements. 220 Just as Curtis's 1847 treatise understood D'Almaine to

announce a music-specific infringement standard, later cases have implicitly
understood Jollie to announce a music-specific originality standard. But these
cases almost never state openly that music disputes operate differently. That
message is written only between the lines. 221
Jollie 's effects took decades to materialize. It did receive an approving nod
in Daly v. Palmer,222 an 1868 case that, like D'Almaine, was focused on the

standard for nonliteral infringement. Other than that, though, judges in the
second half of the nineteenth century didn't cite Jollie in published opinions for
anything to do with copyright scope. On the few occasions during this period
when courts did invoke the case, it was for a different proposition, such as the
unavailability of copyright protection for a work's title. 223
In fact, the next time a case actually teed up a similar question of originality
for musical arrangements, the court not only failed to cite Jollie but also
contradicted it. Carte v. Evans,22 4 an 1886 decision enjoining an unauthorized

piano arrangement of The Mikado's orchestral score, declared that such
arrangements "require[d] musical taste and skill of a high order." 225 The court
reasoned that "[n]o two arrangers, acting independently, and working from the
same original, would do the work in the same way, or would be likely to produce

218. See Brauneis, supra note 151, at 338 n.92 (reviewingJollie'scursory treatmentinthe treatises
of Eaton Drone, James Appleton Morgan, and Walter Arthur Copinger).
219. See, e.g., BRACHA, supra note 46, at 71 (describing "the general acceptance of Story's view
of originality and the decline of the alternative presented by Nelson" over the second half of the
nineteenth century); Brauneis, supranote 151, at 337 (arguing that Jolhe has had "virtually no influence
on copyright law").
220. I have found almost no examples of a litigant urging application of the Jollie standard
outside of the music context, though my search is inevitably ad hoc given the lack of a searchable
database of historical legal filings. For one unsuccessful exception, see Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
at 18, Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 309 U.S. 390 (1940) (Case No. 890) (arguing that a
copyright in any literary adaptation or dramatization of public-domain materials does not cover "those
additions and variations which a writer with experience and skill might readily make" (citing Jollie v.
Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910, 913-14 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437))). The petition was denied, though the
case would eventually reach the Court on a separate issue dealing with apportioning damages. See
Sheldon, 309 U.S. 390 (1940).
221. For an exception that said the quiet part out loud, see Norden v. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F.
Supp. 415, 418 (D. Mass. 1936), discussed infra text accompanying notes 259-58.
222. 6 F. Cas. 1132, 1137 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3,552).
223. See, e.g., Estes v. Williams, 21 F. 189, 189 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1884); Donnelley v. Ivers, 18 F.
592, 595 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882).
224.
27 F. 861 (C.C.D. Mass. 1886).
225. Id. at 862.
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the same results, except so far as they might both resemble the original." 226 The
capabilities of ordinary musicians wasn't the court's touchstone for originality.
Instead, it was the likelihood that musicians could make different choices about
how to solve the same problem-a test that sounds much like the modern Feist
standard and nothing like Nelson's.
Yet in the twentieth century, Jollie was given a second life. The person
most responsible for putting it back on the jurisprudential map was a man named
Joseph James. James was a lawyer, a composer, and at one point the mayor of
Douglasville, Georgia. 227 He was also a founder and leader of the United Sacred
Harp Musical Association, an organization devoted to preserving the Christian

hymnody tradition known as Sacred Harp singing. The movement, which took
its name from Benjamin Franklin White's 1844 hymnal The Sacred Harp, had
by the beginning of the century spread throughout the rural South.228

White, the original compiler of the hymnal, died in 1879.229 James's role in
the development of copyright doctrine was rooted in a dynastic struggle over
who would succeed White as the steward of the hymnal's authoritative edition.
In 1902, after the copyright in the previous incarnation of the hymnal had
expired, Wilson Marian Cooper published a new version that quickly gained
popularity in his native Alabama. 230 Almost all earlier versions had been written
for three voices: treble, tenor, and bass. Cooper's edition supplied a fourth voice
part, an alto, that injected an additional inner harmony into the chords. Cooper's
revision had been the first significant one in decades, and the choice to employ
four- rather than three-part harmony was a genuine innovation in the genre. 23 1
To many in the Sacred Harp movement, however, Cooper was an
outsider. 232 Probably motivated by Cooper's success but unwilling to adopt his
version, James's United Association decided to put out its own revision. 233 That
new revision appeared as The OriginalSacred Harp in 1911.234 Like Cooper's,

the James edition uniformly included an alto line in its hymns. It would
eventually become a great success, subsequently folded into an edition that

226. Id
227. On
James's
background,
see
Joseph
Stephen
James,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph Stephen James [https://perma.cc/P6PZ-QEXL].

WIKIPEDIA,

228.

See BUELL E. COBB, JR., THE SACRED HARP: A TRADITION AND ITS MUSIC 94 (1978).

229.

Id. at 87.

230. Id. at 89; see W. M. COOPER, THE SACRED HARP: REVISED AND IMPROVED BY W. M.
COOPER (1902).

231. See COBB, supranote 228, at 89-91.
232. Id at 90 ("Those who considered themselves to have received the mantle White had passed
down though they admitted a revision was needed-could never sanction such an interloper.").
233. Id at 95.
234. See THE ORIGINAL SACRED HARP (J. S. James ed., 1911). For more on this edition, see
Wallace McKenzie, The Alto Parts in the "True DispersedHarmony" of The Sacred Harp Revisions,
73 MUSICAL Q. 153, 153-54 (1989).
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would become the most widely used Sacred Harp hymnal of the twentieth
century. 235

Despite that ultimate success, however, the James edition began in
controversy. First, the son of the original 1844 compiler formed a secession
movement when the United Association adopted James's revision over his
competing one.2 36 In news that made the front page of Atlanta's leading paper,

that son protested, "The book which has been adopted and which is promulgated
by President James, is a clear infringement on the original song book published
by my father, and contains practically all the songs which he incorporated in his
book." 237 Despite the incendiary language of infringement, though, there's no
indication that he brought any legal action against James.
Cooper, by contrast, was more litigious. In 1913, James advertised a "Great
Singing Convention" in Atlanta for the United Association's annual session. As
shown in the advertisement reproduced below in Figure 4, he billed it as "the
largest gathering of vocalists ever assembled in the Southern States." 238
fireat Sinqinq
Al

Convention

IlTiliI l-AIdIMEJLi Y

Fig. 4: Advertisement for Joseph James's Sacred Harp Singing Convention
Cooper had evidently seen enough. He brought an infringement claim
alleging that James had copied his "arrangements, adaptations and altos." 239
Composing a new alto line for each of the songs, Cooper urged, had been a
235. See McKenzie, supra note 234, at 154. As of the new millennium, the Cooper edition and
the successor to the James edition have split between them nearly all of the geographic territory where
Sacred Harp singing remains popular. See COBB, supra note 228, at 85 (noting that outside of northwest
Georgia and east Atlanta, the successor to the James edition covers the rest of Georgia, north and central
Alabama, the southern tip of Tennessee, and north Mississippi, while Cooper's edition dominates from
west Florida to Texas).
236.
See Sacred HarpSingers Split Over Selecting, ATLANTA CONST., Sept. 9, 1911, at '.
237. Id
238. Exhibit to Letter from J. S. James to Judge William Newman (Sept. 6, 1913), in Case File at
48, 48, Cooperv. James, 213 F. 871, 872 (N.D. Ga. 1914) (No. 37) (on file with the U.S. National Archives
and Records Administration, Atlanta, GA) [hereinafter Cooper Case File].
239. Complaint, in Cooper Case File, supra note 238, at 39, 39 ¶ 2.
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serious undertaking that had greatly improved the underlying three-part
versions. 24 According to Cooper, James had simply taken his alto parts and
inserted them into his hymnal edition rather than come up with his own.
James mostly handled his own defense. In a letter to the court at the outset
of litigation, he painted Cooper's lawsuit as a vexatious attempt to interfere with
the upcoming convention. He asked for an opportunity to be heard before any
restraining order was entered. 241 The court moved quickly, but not nearly that
quickly. On September 12, the date that the singing convention was to begin, it
set a hearing for about two weeks out. 242 It's not clear whether the event in fact
took place. In any case, when the hearing date appeared, James was a no-show.
After a month had passed, James reappeared. He explained that he had been
ill and, according to his physician, had "suffered from a nervous breakdown from
over-work." 243 Nevertheless, he wasn't about to hand off his defense to another
attorney, even though he was nominally working with a cocounsel. "[T]he very
nature of said case," he wrote, "requires petitioner's personal
attention .

.

. [N]obody understands the facts necessary to file this answer but the

defendant ... ."244 With James back in the picture and evidently running the
operation, the court lifted the restraining order.
James's litigation strategy was to paint the composition of the alto line as
yeoman's work. It was a gambit that relied entirely on Jollie. How creative
Cooper's new inner harmony actually was is at least debatable as a question of
fact.245 But under Story's low-originality threshold that had supposedly won out
over Nelson's requirement of musical genius, it's far from obvious that the
answer would have even mattered. So long as Cooper had exercised genuine
intellectual labor in choosing a vocal part that the surrounding voice leading
didn't already dictate, the works should have been protected.
Jollie, however, directed otherwise. The first page in the Cooper case file
is an undated and seemingly freestanding list of authorities, "As to Right to
Original Copyright." And the first such authority listed was Jollie's admonition
that copyright protection should be unavailable to whatever a "writer of music
with experience and skill might readily make." 246 It's not clear whether the
document was prepared by James or by the court itself, but either way it
conforms perfectly to James's theory of the case: that anyone of even modest
musical ability could have composed the alto line.

240. See id. ¶3.
241. See Letter from J. S. James to Judge William Newman (Sept. 6, 1913), in Cooper Case File,
supra note 228, at 48, 49.
242.
Sept. 12, 1913 Scheduling Order, in Cooper Case File, supranote 238, at 43.
243. Oct. 18, 1993 Petition of J. S. James, Cooper Case File, supra note 238, at 34, ¶ 2.
244. Id 3.
245. See McKenzie, supra note 234, at 164-68.
246. List of Authorities, in CooperCase File, supranote 238, at 1(quoting Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F.
Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437)).
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In a set of interrogatories filed with the court, also untitled and undated, a
witness answered a simple "yes" when asked whether the alto part constituted
"an addition which a musician of experience and skill, though not an original
composer, could readily make." 247 Another interrogatory asked, "Does it
necessarily require a person talented in composition to write an alto?" The
witnesses responded that "[i]t would not require originality, but to be correct
would require training." 248 Given the question's design to provide a Jollie-ready
answer, it seems likely that the individual providing the answer was James's
witness.249

In March 1914, James moved to dismiss the complaint in a brief that he
signed as counsel. Jollie, he argued, compelled that result.250 He didn't mince
words. "An alto," he declared, "is absolutely nothing and would be of no value
whatever to anybody without the balance of the tune .... It is not original, it is
nothing." 25 ' He mocked Cooper as
an egotist, that knows nothing about music so as to be a composer of
any ability, that thinks that he can take other peoples [sic] works on
which the copyright has expired and appropriate to his own use in a book
and put his picture in it and take out a good many of the tunes and put
others in the places and claim that he has a copyright. 252
It worked. The court dismissed the case for want of originality, leading with
"the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Nelson" that copyright does not extend 25to3
what a "'writer of music with experience and skill might readily make."'
Cooper's alto lines, the court concluded, failed that test. "[W]hile probably made
by musicians of experience and some skill," the new voice parts were "not
necessarily the productions of persons having the gift of originality in the
composition of music. An alto may be an improvement to a song to some extent,
and probably is; but it can hardly be said to be an original composition, at least
25 4
in the sense of the copyright law."

That this standard sounded patent-like wasn't lost on the court. It made the
connection explicit: "In patents we say that any improvement which a good

mechanic could make is not the subject of a patent, so in music it may be said
that anything which a fairly good musician can make, the same old tune being

247. Undated Interrogatories, in Cooper Case File, supra note 238, at 70.
248. Id
249. The costs section of the court's final judgment reveals that James had taken the testimony
of three witnesses before the case was dismissed. Final Decree, in Cooper Case File, supra note 238, at
99, 99-1cc. Among them, the most likely candidate for the author of these interrogatory responses was
Seabom Denson, who is credited as the composer of the alto lines in James's version of the hymnal. See
McKenzie, supra note 234, at 154 n.4.
250. See Brief of Albert Kemper & J. S. James, in Cooper Case File, supra note 235, at 71, 74.
251. Id at 84-85.
252. Id at 85.
253. Cooper v. James, 213 F. 871, 872 (N.D. Ga. 1914) (quoting Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1850) (No. 7,437)).
254. Id
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preserved, could not be the subject of a copyright." 25 5 Despite the nonchalance
with which the court made this analogy, it remains an extraordinary doctrinal
move. In the early twentieth century, no one had yet explicitly tied the Hotchkiss
inventiveness standard to copyright's originality requirement. Perhaps as a

result, the court hedged on how far its prescription could go. Its holding doesn't
purport to extend to all copyright subject matter but instead only to music.
Three years later, a treatise writer would pick up on this subject-matter
selectivity. William Benjamin Hale, the author of the copyright treatise that
formed a volume of the legal encyclopedia Corpus Juris, wrote that musical
arrangements needed to leap a double hurdle in order to obtain protection. First,
as with any copyrightable subject, the composition "must be original, within the
meaning of originality as elsewhere explained." 26 But, citing both Jollie and
Cooper, the treatise added Justice Nelson's further requirement that the work
must display more than mere mechanical skill. Picking up right where Cooper

had left off, it posited that "[t]he distinction is substantially that made in the law
of patents between the exercise of inventive genius and the exercise of mere
mechanical skill; the former is protected by the statute, but the latter is not."257
Modern practitioners wouldn't recognize that proposition. There is no

doctrinal first principle that supports a more patent-like protectability threshold
for musical works than for other works. But Jollie was a music case, and the
Cooper court didn't need anything more than a music case to reach its preferred
outcome. By 1920, then, judges had a fledgling line of authority concluding that
patent's standard of invention was a reasonable fit for music copyright.
That authority would be invoked sporadically, appearing only a handful of
times over the remaining decades of the twentieth century. But even its few
citations were prominent enough to reinforce the notion that musical originality
should be slotted on a different analytical track than other kinds. In Norden v.
Oliver Ditson Co., 258 the work-in-suit was an English-language adaptation of a

Russian hymn that had required rhythmic changes to compensate for the new
words' syllabification. On the strength of Jollie and Cooper, the court held that
the piece was ineligible for protection. Works of visual art, the court deduced,
"need not, like patents, disclose the originality of invention, but may present an
old theme if there is distinguishable variation." 25 9 Musical works, by contrast,
were to be judged by Cooper's "fairly good musician" standard. Copyright
wasn't available for the English-language arrangement because it "remained 'the
same old tune,"' whose changes "any skilled musician might make." 260

255.

Id

256. WILLIAM B. HALE, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY
PROPERTY § III (1917).

257.
258.
259.
260.

Id
13 F. Supp. 415, 416 (D. Mass. 1936).
Id at 418.
Id
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Similarly, in Arnstein v. Edward B. Marks Music Corp.,261 the court

announced that when assessing the copyrightability of musical arrangements,
"the same test is to be applied as in the case of patents; that is, it must indicate
an exercise of inventive genius as distinguished from mere mechanical skill or
change." 262 Unlike the works involved in earlier cases that had invoked Nelson's
standard, the pop song at issue in Arnstein was a new piece rather than a new
arrangement of a preexisting one. Perhaps as a result, the court deemed it to be

sufficiently inventive to pass that high bar. 263 Along the way, though, the court
signaled how little it thought of the authorship involved in these mass-culture
products, writing that neither the plaintiff's nor the defendant's music was a
"work of great merit." 264 They were, rather, "popular songs of the kind that have
a limited vogue and soon pass into the great limbo of forgotten songs, never to
be resurrected."

265

By this point, Jollie's limited progeny had become recognizable as its own
line of originality doctrine. In a 1941 report to Congress, for example, the
Register of Copyrights wrote that courts held the power to "den[y] the validity
of a claim of copyright based on an alleged authorship where that authorship was
found to be lacking." 266 This is an unextraordinary assertion, so far as it goes,
but the Register's best authority for that proposition was a single string cite of
four cases: Jollie, Norden, Cooper, and Arnstein. 267 To the Register, apparently,

those cases most clearly represented what the absence of originality looked like.
Similarly, when Zechariah Chafee wrote his famous Reflections on the Law

of Copyright in 1945,268 the move toward patents had become familiar enough
for him to endorse it as a bedrock principle. After quoting "Judge Nelson's test,"
Chafee observed that music copyright operated by "an analogy to the rule which
refuses to patent an improvement on an existing invention, if any good mechanic

could think up the improvement." 269 To Chafee, the analogy was meant to ensure
that merely minimal additions didn't prevent what today we might call
evergreening of protection for expressive works. 270 That goal, of course, is a
familiar one. It's shared by most contemporary commentators and reflected in
judges' regular insistence that derivative works be readily distinguishable from

261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

11F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), aff'd, 82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936).

266.

THE LIBR. OF CONG. COPYRIGHT OFF., FORTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE

Id at 536.
Id
Id at 535.
Id

REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 16 (1941), https://www.copyright.gov/reports/annual/archive/ar-194.pdf
[https://penna.cc/R9KX-TFA6].
267. Id at 16 n.8.
268. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 COLuM. L. REV. 503 (1945).
269. Id at 512.
270. Id

ORIGINALITY'S OTHER PATH

2021 ]

899

their underlying originals. 27 1 But tying the bar for sufficient additions to what

"any good mechanic could think up" remains a fundamental break from the rest
of the generally applicable originality standard. Whereas a derivative in other
fields might be able to skate past so long as it was distinguishable enough from
the original work, a musical derivative would also need to differentiate itself
from the universe of other potential derivatives that persons having skill in the
art were likely to produce.
Despite Chafee's imprimatur, however, over the remaining thirty years
before Congress would pass the current Copyright Act, only one case would rely
on the Jo/lie standard, McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp. in 1958.272 And
between the Copyright Act's passage and the Supreme Court's 1991 Feist

decision clarifying originality doctrine's low-creativity threshold, no case relied
on it. An observer in the early 1990s could have reasonably guessed that
Nelson's high-creativity threshold had simply died out.
But it hadn't. Three years after the Supreme Court decided Feist, Nelson's
threshold came back. The vehicle was Woods v. Bourne Co., 273 a rights-reversion

case that hinged on whether a particular musical arrangement qualified as an
independently protectable derivative work. The Copyright Act of 1976 permits
authors or their statutory heirs to terminate certain transfers after fifty-six years
from the inception of the copyright term, notwithstanding any agreement to the
contrary. 274 Authors and their beneficiaries can thus recapture the interests that
they had once bargained away. But the statute makes an exception for the owner
of a derivative work that had been prepared under the authority of the grant. 275
Even after the grant is terminated and other rights revert back to the grantor, the
derivative work's owner can continue exploiting it. For example, a film studio
could continue selling copies of a motion picture that had been derived from a
novel, notwithstanding the novelist's recapture of the exclusive right to exploit
the literary work itself. Woods presented the question of how this provision
should apply to different arrangements of a musical work.

271. See, e.g., Schrock v. Learning Curve Int'l, Inc., 586 F.3d 513, 521 (7th Cir. 2009) (concluding
that in assessing the copyrightability of a derivative work, "the key inquiry is whether there is sufficient
nontrivial expressive variation in the derivative work to make it distinguishable from the underlying
work in some meaningful way"); i MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

§ 3.03[A] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.), LEXIS (database updated 2021) (defining the "necessary
quantum of originality" for a derivative work to be any variation "that is sufficient to render the
derivative work distinguishable from its prior work in any meaningful manner").
272. See McIntyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681, 683 (S.D. Cal. 1958) (relying on
Cooper for the proposition that the plaintiff couldn't receive a copyright for "the addition of certain
inconsequential melodic and harmonic embellishments such as are frequently improvised by any
competent musician").
273. See 841 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev 'd in part on other grounds, 6o F.3d 978 (2d Cir.

1995).
274. See 17 U.S.C. § 304(c). This provision only applies to transfers that predate the 1976 Act's
passage. A separate termination provision, not at issue in Woods, applies to transfers that postdate it. See

id § 203.
275.

Id § 304(c)(6)(A).
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The dispute began when the heirs of Harry Woods, the composer of the
1926 hit When the Red, Red Robin Comes Bob-Bob-Bobbin Along, exercised
their termination rights to recapture the rights to (and future royalties from) the
song, which had been assigned to a publisher the same year it was written. 276
The publisher's successor, trying to retain those royalty streams even after
termination, countered that it wasn't exploiting the original work but only

derivative arrangements that it had prepared. If it was in fact using its own
derivative works rather than the original one whose ownership had reverted, then
under the statute's derivative work exception it would continue collecting
royalties. As a result, the court needed to classify legally just what it was that the
publisher had been exploiting: The same original song that Woods wrote in 1926,
or a separately copyrightable arrangement? As the trial judge would eventually
frame the case, that argument teed up the fundamental question, "What is a
derivative work?" 277
According to the publisher, the underlying work was the songwriter's
unpublished lead sheet, comprising no more than lyrics and the melody line, that
he submitted for commercial publication. 278 The publisher's first commercial
piano-vocal arrangement was, as a result, an independently protected derivative
of that lead sheet, and all subsequent versions were either copies of that
arrangement or new derivative works themselves. 279 By that definition, the only
renditions of the song that had ever been commercially exploited in its history
would have been publisher-authored derivatives; the songwriter's original work
would have been like the tree falling in the forest without making a sound.
The case proceeded to a two-day bench trial before Judge Richard Owen in
1992. Though randomly assigned, Judge Owen was a fitting choice. He was

likely one of the most musically literate judges in the history of the federal
judiciary. To begin with, he was a bona fide opera composer. 280 Over the course
of his tenure on the bench, he wrote nine of them. 281As a break from his day job,
he studied the craft at the Manhattan School of Music, eventually earning an
honorary doctorate there. 282 In 1976, he also decided one of music copyright's
most famous infringement trials, finding that George Harrison's solo hit My
Sweet Lord had unconsciously plagiarized from the song He's So Fine as

276. Woods, 6o F.3d at 981.
277. Woods, 841 F. Supp. at 120.
278. Woods, 6o F.3d at 989.
279. Id
280. See Roberta Hershenson, Law from His Court Bench, Operafrom the PianoBench, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 23, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/02/23/nyregion/law-from-his-court-bench-operafrom-the-piano-bench.html [https://perma.cc/JXP3-TK78]; Deaths: Owen, Richard, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
26,
2015),
https://archive.nytimes.com/query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage9Bo3E3D8103AF935A15752C1A9639D8B63.html [https://perma.cc/PL2N-ZH4X].
281.

Deaths: Owen, Richard,supra note 280.

282.

Id
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recorded by The Chiffons. 283 Owen wasn't shy about bringing his musical chops
to bear on the witnesses appearing before him. As Owen himself would later
reflect in an interview with the magazine Opera News:

I did find that [Harrison] had taken their main theme, but it was
subconscious plagiarism. I went home after the first night and thought,
'Well, nobody asked this man the right questions.' The next day, when
he got back on the witness stand, I said, 'Mr. Harrison, where did you
get this theme?' and sang it to him. He said, 'Mind if I get my guitar?'

And for about forty-five minutes, we sang to each other. The transcript
is marvelous, because it reads, 'WITNESS SINGS/JUDGE SINGS.' 284
In the Woods bench trial, the judge similarly took the reins of the
examination. Most of the relevant facts were stipulated in advance, and the only
witnesses to testify were the publisher's owner and the parties' dueling music
experts. 285 On direct examination, the Juilliard professor appearing as the
publisher's expert testified that, in his view, the arrangements contained
numerous creative additions that reflected "knowing what to include and not
include throughout the scope of a piece."286 In a line that would have made
Nelson proud, the judge interjected disapprovingly, "Is this something that is

basically within the skills in your opinion of a cocktail-hour pianist at the St.
Regis if he was playing this thing?" 287 The two then had the following colloquy:
Witness: How good a cocktail pianist?
Court: He went to Julliard.

Witness: A Juilliard grad. Okay. I'm saying it is not necessarily a work
of genius. If you are asking, is this Beethoven? Probably not .... Could
Beethoven use this line? Yes. I would almost venture to say you would
find it somewhere in Beethoven's work. I don't know if that makes this
particular line brilliant. It is certainly creative. 288
The expert testifying on behalf of Woods's heirs would later pick up on the
court's dismissiveness of the hypothetical cocktail-hour pianist. At the close of
his testimony, he parroted back that the publisher's additions and deletions "are
nothing more than those simple choices that any of us would make, that any
journeyman musician would make, that any cocktail pianist would make. They
are not creatively significant."

289

283. See Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 18o-81 (S.D.N.Y.
1976).
284. Brian Kellow, On the Beat, OPERA NEWS, Feb. 2003, at 8.
285. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Bourne Co. at 6, Woods v. Boume Co., 6o F.3d 978 (2d
Cir. 1995) (No. 94-7421) (on file with author); Transcript of Proceedings at 2, 64, 112, Woods v. Bourne
Co., 8 4 1F. Supp. 118, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (No. 89 Civ. 3641) (on file with author).
286. Transcript of Proceedings at 72, Woods v. Boume Co., 841 F. Supp. 118, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(No. 89 Civ. 3641) (on file with author).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id at 192.
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The judge and the publisher's expert, meanwhile, parried back and forth
about the musical significance of various compositional choices, talking shop on
the classification of particular harmonies. 290 When the publisher recalled the
expert to the stand the following day, Owen shared the details of his morning
working through the case at home at the keyboard:
I played these through the piano from 7:30 to 8:15 this morning. A
number of times. This coda-(court singing)-as he has there is any one
of 50 ways you can get out of this song. You could have had a chord
and you could have gone up in a minor II and then gone into a V and hit
a cadence and you're out. So this is just a matter of choice. He could
have done anything. He could have put a trill in there and then an Fnatural and finally hit the F-sharp and the leading tone and he is home. 291
Of course, under Feist, the fact that the arranger had many choices should
cut in favor of copyrightability, not against it. And that's how the expert
understood the suggestion, replying that the judge's realization had simply
confirmed the piece's "creative concept." 2 92
Yet the Feist standard notwithstanding, Owen wasn't nearly as interested
in choice for choice's sake. He wanted to see a sufficiently meritorious choice.
"I will now be a music critic," 293 he declared-seeming to fly in the face of
Justice Holmes's now-canonical admonition against judges assessing aesthetic
merit. 294 "Playing it through," Owen explained, "I much preferred" the earlier

version from 1926, which had "a lot more harmonic interest."295 A later
arrangement had concededly added a "semi ostinato bass," but to Owen that had
only made things worse, as the new material "detract[ed] from the way the song
flowed." 2 96
Roughly a year after the trial ended, the court issued a decision finding in
the heirs' favor. It held that none of the publisher's contributions since the song's
lead-sheet origins constituted a protectable derivative work. 297 The changes
were, in its view, simply too banal. "[A]s far back as Mr. Justice Nelson in Jollie
v. Jacques [sic]," Owen explained, a protectable musical work needed to possess
"additions and variations, which a writer of music with experience and skill
might readily make." 298 Relying also on Jollie's twentieth-century successors

290. See, e.g., id at 86 (discussing whether a chord is properly considered a 7th or a 9th); id at
87-88 (discussing whether a chord is a dominant 7th or instead a diminished 7th).
291. Id at 198-99.
292. Id at 199.
293. Id
294. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) ("It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the
worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits.").
295. Transcript of Proceedings, supra note 286, at 199.
296. Id at 199-200.
297. Woods v. Bourne Co., 84 1F. Supp. 118, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1994), rev 'd in parton othergrounds,
6o F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995).
298. Id at 122 (quoting Jollie v. Jaques, 13 F. Cas. 910 (C.C.S.D.N.Y.1850) (No. 7,437)).
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Cooper,Norden, and McIntyre, Owen took his quip about cocktail pianists from

his trial questioning and enshrined it in the pages of the Federal Supplement. The
opinion declared that a musical derivative work needs "more than mere cocktail
pianist variations of the piece that are standard fare in the music trade by any
competent musician."299 To pass muster, it should have "such things as unusual
vocal treatment, additional lyrics of consequence, unusual altered harmonies,
novel sequential uses of themes-something of substance added making the
piece to some extent a new work with the old song embedded in it but from which
the new has developed."

300

Because the arrangements at issue failed to clear this "competent musician"
bar, the court held them to be merely versions of the original rather than
independently protected derivative works. The royalty streams from those
arrangements would thus revert back to the heirs.
The publisher appealed, predictably criticizing what it perceived to be the
trial judge's conflation of copyright and patent standards of protectability. 301 It
disparaged the Jo/lie and Cooper reeds on which the district court had hung its
patent-like standard as "two obsolete district court cases and their progeny. "302
The heirs, for their part, contended that the court was simply remaining faithful
to the special regime that had historically governed musical works. According to
their brief, Owen had not "appl[ied] patent standards," but rather had applied
"the standards that have always prevailed in holdings concerning originality of
derivative works of music and other performing arts."303
In a way, the publisher and the heirs were both right. Just as the publisher
had argued, the trial court's framework resembled a patentability framework far
more than a traditional copyright one. At the same time, just as the heirs had
argued, music cases didn't always play by the same rules as the ones that
tradition generally emphasized.304 Though the publisher didn't style it this way,
its argument was effectively a plea for music cases to rejoin the rest of the pack.

299.

Id at 121.
300. Id
301. See Brief of Defendant-Appellant Bourne Co., supra note 285, at 33 (criticizing the district
court's test as perhaps "appropriate to evaluate the validity of a patent" but inappropriate for copyright
cases and "contrary to the Congressional intent" behind the Copyright Act of 1976).
302. Id
303. Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 17-18, Woods, 6o F.3d 978 (No. 94-7421) (on file with
author).
304. Justin Hughes has highlighted this discrepancy in the Woods decision, observing that the
court's "competent musician" language "would be disconcerting to almost any other class of
beneficiaries of copyright law." See Hughes, supra note 12, at 123. He argues that '[i]f we substituted
'screenwriter' or 'painter' in place of 'musician,' we would have opinions denying copyrights to works
that are the 'standard fare in the trade by any competent screenwriter,' or 'anything a fairly good painter
c[ould] make.' These phrases sound much more like the patent law standard for novelty than the postBleistein standard for copyright protection." Id
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Though the appeals court hedged a bit on the district court's choice of
language, it wound up affirming.305 True, the Second Circuit acknowledged, "the

requirement of originality is not the same as the requirement of novelty, the
higher standard usually applied to patents." 306 Owen's requirement of "unusual
vocal treatment" and the like was therefore "overstate [d]." 307 But that line, in the
appeals court's view, was merely a stray bit of dictum in the midst of an
otherwise correct identification and application of the originality standard. 308
Significantly, the appeals court did not cast similar aspersions on the part of
Owen's decision that pitted competent musicians and cocktail pianists against
putatively genuine composers. All that dichotomy meant, according to the
Second Circuit, was the innocuous proposition that special physical skills or
training is insufficient to achieve protectable originality. 309 Never explained was

how one could get to that reading from a starting point that all but demanded
outperforming the average practitioner in the field. In any event, the court was
satisfied that Owen had gotten the originality standard right. 310
The latest invocation of the Jo/lie standard was in the recent, headline31
grabbing litigation over the copyright status of the song We Shall Overcome. 1
In 2017, the district court judge overseeing that case invoked Owen's "cocktail
pianist" test as appellate precedent, quoting the Second Circuit's acceptance of
the reasoning below. 312 That test hadn't been cited in the written submissions of
either party, so the judge seems to have chosen it sua sponte. In fact, it's far from
clear that the court even needed a heightened threshold to reach the outcome it
eventually did. Because the plaintiff seeking protection for its version's first
verse was relying principally on individual word changes, such as "will" to
"shall" and "down" to "deep," the arrangement failed easily. 313 Nevertheless, the
court seemed prepared to set the bar higher for any future music arrangements.
It justified its ruling on the grounds that the variations at issue were "standard
fare in the music trade by any competent musician." 314

305. Woods, 6o F.3d at 990-93. The appeals court did, however, reverse in part on a separate
issue regarding post-termination uses within pre-termination audiovisual works. See id at 988.
306. Id at 991.
307. Id at 990-91.
308. Id at 991.
309. Id
310. Id ("[W]e conclude that the district court articulated the correct standard of
originality .... ").
311. See Christopher Mele, 'We Shall Overcome' Is Put in Public Domain in a Copyright
Settlement, N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/26/business/media/we-shalloverwome-copyright.html [https://perma.cc/N56P-RLUM].
312. We Shall Overcome Found. v. Richmond Org., Inc., No. 16cv2725, 2017 WL 3981311, at *13
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2017) ("[T]he Court of Appeals has observed that 'stylized versions of the original
song,' such as a 'cocktail pianist variations of the piece that are standard fare in the music trade by any
competent musician,' are insufficient to satisfy the requirement of originality." (quoting Woods, 6o F.3d
at 991)).
313. Id at *14.
314. Id (quoting Woods, 60 F.3d at 991).
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As of this writing, it remains to be seen whether this high-profile
endorsement will meaningfully increase the salience of the Jollie standard. In the
meantime, to be sure, only two cases have relied on Jollie since the Supreme
Court decided Feist in 1991. Still, those cases combined with their earlier
predecessors arguably form their own body of law. Litigants can now colorably
argue that musical derivatives are simply different doctrinal creatures than
literary derivatives. True, as Feist cautioned, "[o]riginality does not signify
novelty." 15 But in music cases originality seems to signify at least something
closer to novelty than copyright practitioners would otherwise be used to.316

WHERE

IV.
ORIGINALITY'S OTHER PATH LEADS

I confess that, in a sense, calling any judicial decision that's reliant on Jollie
a part of a "path" is overclaiming. The high-originality cases discussed in the
previous Section don't form a neat line. They're something more like
jurisprudential cicadas, emerging loudly once every couple of decades and then
disappearing until we've long since forgotten about them.
But though scattered across a 170-year expanse, these cases nevertheless
remain in conversation with each other. And they offer a few lessons for those
thinking about copyright law today. The most basic one is probably that, for
those commentators who would like to see a more patent-like originality test, the
notion has some historical pedigree. 317 While I'm not here subscribing to such
proposals on the merits, those who already have may find it useful to have more
precedential wind in their sails.
More broadly, though, Jollie and its lineage should inform current debates
about what copyright is. The history recounted here should inform across at least
three issues: the extent of the historical connection between copyright and patent
law; the viability of judicial tailoring of facially uniform copyright standards;
and the inherent factual contingency of doctrines that, over time, we may have
come to treat as foreordained. I discuss each below.
A.

Family Resemblances

The Jollie standard bolsters the argument that, however much copyright
and patent may differ as mature fields today, they grew up together. The most
famous proponent of that argument was the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in
in Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, which asserted that the two regimes

315. FeistPubl'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
316. As a leading treatise summarizes the case law since the turn of the twentieth century, courts
in these cases have "produced a somewhat higher standard of distinguishable, nontrivial variation than
is applied to other forms of derivative works." GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, § 2.16.2.2 (citing Cooper,
McIntyre, Norden, Woods, and We Shall Overcome Foundation).

317.
Cf Miller, supra note 6, at 471 (arguing, based on Jollie alone, that "[t]he contemporary
taboo against comparing originality to nonobviousness" is a recent development).
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share a "historic kinship." 318 Since then, courts have repeatedly justified
applying precedent from one area to another. 319 Yet Jollie's forgotten post-

history turns out to support the kinship theory much better than Sony's own cited
authorities do.
That theory merits some initial skepticism. Although the same
Constitutional provision empowers Congress to legislate in both areas, 320 the
kinship that the Sony court spoke of was hardly self-evident. On the contrary, as
Peter Menell and David Nimmer have chronicled, the evidence that the Court
marshalled for it is underwhelming. 321 The Court cited three exemplary
precedents meant to show that patent law could be used to interpret copyright
law.322 But two of those precedents dealt with questions of how the entitlement
could be legally exploited as an industrial asset, not of the entitlement's internal
workings themselves. One was an antitrust case addressing the practice of
refusing to grant a license for one work unless the recipient would also agree to
license others. 323 The other dealt with whether copyright licenses qualified as
instrumentalities of the federal government, a status that would have exempted
the gross receipts of royalties from state taxation. 324 Neither analogy tells us
much about the exclusive rights themselves, how they may be earned, how they
may be infringed, or how their violation may be remedied.325
The third case, Wheaton v. Peters, is more on point. 326 Wheaton was an

1834 decision that rejected the assertion of perpetual common-law copyright for
published works, whose statutory copyright was limited in time. The plaintiffs
there had argued against drawing any lessons from patent doctrine, which offered
no protection at common law.327 But Justice McLean, who about fifteen years

318. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 (1984). In the exact
context of Sony, the Court relied on the kinship to justify applying the Patent Act's "staple article or
commodity of commerce" limitation on contributory infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), even though the
Copyright Act lacks any such limitation-or, indeed, any contributory infringement provision
whatsoever.
319. The Supreme Court has invoked this "kinship" rationale most recently in Impression
Products, Inc. v. Lexmark International, Inc. in support of a rule that a foreign sale of a patented item
exhausts U.S. patent rights in that item, just as it would for a copy of a copyrighted work. 137 S. Ct. 1523,
1536 (2017). For a survey of lower-court references to this language, see David W. Barnes, Abuse of
Supreme Court Precedent: The "HistoricKinship," 16 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 85 (2016).
320. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; Edward C. Walterscheid, Divergent Evolution of the
PatentPower and the CopyrightPower, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 307, 309 (2005) (arguing that
it's reasonable to suppose that "by using the singular 'the exclusive Right' and combining authority to
create both patents and copyrights in the same Clause, the Framers intended the legal consequences of
both the patent grant and the copyright grant to be similar, if not identical").
321. Peter S. Menell & David Nimmer, Unwinding Sony, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 941, 985-89 (2007).
322. Sony, 464 U.S. at 439 n.19.
323. United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158-59 (1948).
324. Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 126 (1932).
325. See Menell & Nimmer, supra note 321, at 986.
326. Wheatonv. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591(1834).
327. See id at 598 (recounting the plaintiffs argument that "the subjects of patents and of
copyrights have little analogy" and are "widely different").
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later would author the trial court decision in Hotchkiss, concluded that authors
and inventors deserved like treatment. He asked rhetorically:
In what respect does the right of an author differ from that of an
individual who has invented a most useful and valuable machine? In the
production of this, his mind has been as intensely engaged, as long; and,
perhaps, as usefully to the public, as any distinguished author in the
composition of his book.
The result of their labours may be equally beneficial to society, and in
their respective spheres they may be alike distinguished for mental
vigour. Does the common law give a perpetual right to the author, and
withhold it from the inventor? And yet it has never been pretended that
the latter could hold, by the common law, any property in his invention,
after he shall have sold it publicly.
Does not the man who imitates the machine profit as much by the labour
of another, as he who imitates or republishes a book? Can there be a
difference between the types and press with which one is formed; and
the instruments used in the construction of the others?3 28
Wheaton, unlike the other cases on which the Sony court's asserted kinship
relies, at least ties the two regimes at a theoretical and doctrinal level.329 But as
foundational as Wheaton is within the copyright canon, it's still just a single reed
on which to hang the argument. That reed might look especially slim in light of
other twentieth-century pronouncements from the Court refusing to engage in
similar cross-regime analogies.

330

Jo/lie and its lineage, however, lends the analogy the extra support that the
Sony court perhaps didn't know it had. In the mid-nineteenth century, a high-

creativity threshold for protectability was part of the same conversation for
copyrights and patents alike. For a brief moment, the justices were engaged in a
project of uniting a creative class of authors and inventors together as a
categorical antithesis of the skilled mechanic.
During this same period, Justice McLean continued the logic of
equivalence that he began in Wheaton. He questioned the entire existence of
copyright's then-ascendant fair use doctrine precisely because no equivalent
limitation existed in patent law. In an 1847 decision that is surprisingly never

mentioned in discussions of copyright's and patent's historical connections,
Justice McLean pronounced that "[t]he same rule of decision should be applied

328. Id. at 657-58.
329. Though, as Menell and Nimnmer observe, Wheaton would at best support analogizing
between judge-made doctrines, not inserting a congressionally enacted provision from one statute into
another, as the Court did in Sony. See Menell & Nimnmer, supra note 321, at 986-87.
330. See, e.g., Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 346 (1908) ("There are such wide
differences between the right[s] . . protected by the copyright statute and the rights secured to an
inventor under the patent statutes, that the cases which relate to the one subject are not altogether
controlling as to the other." (quoting John D. Park & Sons Co. v. Hartman, 153 F. 24, 28 (6th Cir. 1907))).
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to a copyright as to a patent for a machine." 331He began from the premise that
"[t]he construction of any other machine which acts upon the same principle,"
no matter how much simpler or cheaper, infringes the patent. Copyright, he
reasoned, should operate no differently: "Now an abridgment, if fairly made
contains the principle of the original work, and this constitutes its value. Why,
then, in reason and justice, should not the same principle be applied in a case of
copyright as in that of a patented machine?"332 McLean begrudgingly relented

from the analogy only because he felt constrained by the earlier cases that had
already recognized fair use as a distinctive limitation on copyright. 333
Jollie's progeny show a remarkable willingness to turn to patent principles
at least for musical derivative works. Some judges even expressly concluded that
patent cases provide a better analytical roadmap for that subject matter than other
copyright cases do. 334 They had no difficulty drawing from patent's well when
copyright alone didn't provide what they were looking for.
Even the cover page of the work at issue in Jollie suggests some slippage

between the categories of authorship and inventorship. Recall that the sheet
music specified who "invented" the choreography, 335 an output that would today
be categorized as authorial. 336 At the time, though, the term "invention" included
artistic novelties. Even as far back as 1697, John Dryden used the term to

describe the work of both poets and scientists in the same breath. An author's
"[w]ant of invention," he wrote, is treated like "a capital crime . . for a poet is
a maker . .. and who cannot make, that is, invent, hath his name for nothing." 337
D 'Almaine v. Boosey, the British case that provided Jollie its sole legal authority

for a heightened creativity threshold, similarly stated that a composition's

331. Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171,173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497). A Westlaw search
of the case's citing references shows only one that mentions Sony's "historic kinship" language, and
even that article cited it for an unrelated issue. See Walterscheid, supra note 320, at 328 n.130.
332. Story, 23 F. Cas. at 173.
333. Id ("I am . . bound by precedent; and I yield to it in this instance, more as a principle of
law, than a rule of reason or justice.").
334. See Amsteinv. Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 11 F. Supp. 535, 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1935), aff'd,
82 F.2d 275 (2d Cir. 1936); Cooper v. James, 213 F. 871, 872 (N.D. Ga. 1914); see also Chafee, supra note
268, at 512; HALE, supra note 256.
335. See Cover page to Samuel Jollie's sheet music for The Serious Family Polka, supra Figure
I.

336. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(4) (listing "choreographic works" among the categories of
copyrightable works of authorship).
337. John Dryden, Dedication ofthe Aneis, in VIRGIL'SkNEID 5, 39 (Charles W. Eliot ed., John
Dryden, trans., Cosimo 2009) (1697). Later in his essay, Dryden would go on to assail efforts that place
the "invention" standard too high, sounding the same themes of incremental, cumulative authorship as
Story would over a century later in Emerson v. Davies. See id ("[I]f invention is to be taken in so strict
a sense, that the matter of a poem must be wholly new,... the history of Troy was no more the invention
of Homer than of Virgil .... At this rate, as Solomon hath told us, there is nothing new beneath the sun.
Who then can pass for an inventor, if Homer, as well as Virgil, must be depriv'd of that glory?"). My
point is, then, not that Dryden thought that good poetry needed to clear a high ingenuity bar, but that he
discussed that bar in the language of invention to begin with.
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melody "is the invention of the author" and "that in which the whole meritorious
part of the invention consists." 338
Both the 1828 and 1841 editions of Webster's dictionary define the word

"invention" to include not just the development of new devices like the cotton
gin and thermometer but also several distinctly artistic meanings: "fiction" (as in
"fables are the inventions of ingenious men"); a painter's "finding or choice of
the objects which are to enter into the composition of the piece"; a poet's
"add[itions] to the history of the subject"; and a rhetorician's "finding and
selecting of arguments to prove and illustrate the point in view." 339 The 1907
edition, from Cooper v. James'stime, still defined "invention" in the context of

the fine arts as meaning "[t]he exercise of the imagination in selecting and
treating a theme, or more commonly in contriving the arrangement of a piece, or

the method of presenting its parts." 340 Given that the doctrine of "invention" was
patent law's conceptual source for a heightened creativity threshold, should it be
surprising that some judges in this era would try to fit authorial works into the
same box?
To be clear, I'm not at all arguing as a normative matter that doctrinal
borders between copyright and patent should be weak. While it's not my project
here to make this case, I agree with the many who have argued that society loses
out when IP doctrines fail to channel particular innovations into the regime that's
best tailored to them. 34' Not all creative outputs should receive copyright's cheap
acquisition costs and life-plus-seventy-years duration. Nor should all receive
patent's thicker scope and absolute excludability even against independent
developers. Many of the Court's IP cases, moreover, have been devoted to
precisely such channeling. 342 But as a descriptive matter, the cases following in
Jollie's footsteps suggest that some authorial works fall close enough to the
patent side of the divide to invite cross-border exchange. 343 In these cases'
338.
339.

(1835) 16o Eng. Rep.

117, 123; iY. & C. Ex. 288, 302.
I NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1001 (New

York, S. Converse 1828) (definition of the noun, invention); NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 466 (New York, White & Sheffield, abr. rev. ed. 1841)
(same).
340.

1WEBSTER' S INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE

785 (Noah Porter

ed., new ed., 1907) (definition of the noun, invention).
341. The literature on the importance of such channeling doctrines is vast and still growing. See,
e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Strategiesfor Discerningthe Boundariesof Copyrightand PatentProtections,

92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1493 (2017); Christopher Buccafusco & Mark A. Lemley, Functionality
Screens, 103 VA. L. REV. 1293 (2017); Kevin Emerson Collins, PatentLaw 's Authorship Screen, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1603 (2017).
342. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, rot U.S. 99 (1880) (copyrights and patents); Star Athletica, L.L.C.
v. Varsity Brands, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017) (same); TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532
U.S. 23 (2001) (trademarks and patents).
343. Though dealing with infringement rather than protectability, the case of Thomas v. Lennon,
14 F. 849 (Lowell, Circuit Justice, C.C.D. Mass. 1883), which is quoted at the top of this Article, is
another example of such exchange. The case concerned Gounod's oratorio The Redemption. The
plaintiff, later to become the founding music director of the Chicago Symphony Orchestra, was
Gounod's exclusive U.S. licensee. Because he was in negotiations with Boston's Handel & Haydn
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conception, copyright and patent are indeed kinsmen. Even the "heart of patent

law"344 evolved from a common ancestor.
B.

Subject-Matter Tailoring

A second takeaway of Jollie's lineage is that courts have the power to
condition the scope of seemingly one-size-fits-all standards on the particular
subject matter at issue. Tailoring has become a familiar phenomenon in
copyright law, particularly at the legislative level. Statutory copyright has
become increasingly industry-specific over the last century, particularly since
the passage of the 1976 Act. 345 The Act includes special provisions for particular
kinds of works, including musical compositions, 346 sound recordings, 347
architectural works, 348 and computer programs. 349 It also contains exceptions

and limitations for particular kinds of licensees, including noncommercial
broadcasters, 350 satellite carriers, 351 cable companies, 352 and jukebox
operators. 353 The statute's detailed interventions into particular markets and
carveouts for particular commercial constituencies has made the area of law far
more regulatory than it once was.354

The Jollie line of cases is an example of a different sort of tailoring, one the
courts have led. Open-ended standards allow judges to adjust the margins of

Society for an exclusive performance, he refused the defendant's licensing request for a second Bostonarea concert. The defendant then sought to preempt the authorized performance by creating his own
orchestration from a piano score that had been sold in England and then having his ensemble play that
orchestration. Under the existing U.S. law concerning foreign publications, those sales had injected the
underlying melodies and harmonies into the public domain. The question before the court was whether
"a new orchestration, not copied from the original by memory, report, or otherwise, but made from the
book, is an infringement of the plaintiff's rights." Id at 851. Because it concluded that orchestration was
an "essential part" of the piece, its answer was yes. Id at 853. To reach that result, it found patent law
more helpful than the copyright law concerning literary works: "[A]n opera is more like a patented
invention than like a common book; he who shall obtain similar results, better or worse, by similar
means, though the opportunity is furnished by an unprotected book, should be held to infringe the rights
of the composer." Id
344. See Michel, supranote 19, at 143.
345. See, e.g., JosephP. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REv. 87, 97, 105-06 (2004) (noting
the origins of industry-specific rights and limitations in the 1909 Act, followed by even more complex
tailoring in the 1976 Act); CRAIG JOYCE, TYLER T. OCHOA & MICHAEL CARROLL, COPYRIGHT LAW
25 (1ith ed. 2020) (describing recent additions to the Copyright Act over the last forty years that "legislate
particular regulatory solutions to short-term problems posed by particular technologies in minute (if not
exquisite) detail").
346. 17 U.S.C. § 115.
347. Id § 114.
348. Id § 120.
349. Id § 117.
350. Id § 118.
351. Id. § 119.
352. Id. 111.
353. Id. § 116.
354. See generallyLiu, supra note 345.
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doctrinal categories for different kinds of works (or parties). 355 Commentators
have pointed to such standards as a key mechanism for courts to reduce IP laws'
otherwise high "uniformity cost," the under-protection or overprotection of
different categories of innovative activity that comes with a unitary
entitlement. 356 Performing this tailoring through judge-made doctrine can avoid
some of the administrative costs, industry capture, and quick obsolescence that
often accompany legislative carveouts for specific technologies. 357
One way

patent

law implements

such tailoring

is by tying

its

nonobviousness standard to the person having ordinary skill in the art.358 The
more skill those in the relevant field have on average, the more skill will be
attributed to the legal construct of the ordinary person, and the easier it will be
for a given invention to be held obvious. The analysis yields industry- or
technology-specific applications, in effect even if not in intent. 359
Copyright law's originality threshold, however, lacks a similarly contextsensitive foothold. Unlike the Patent Act and Hotchkiss before it, neither the
Copyright Act nor the Court's originality jurisprudence specifies a perspective

from which a work's level of creativity is meant to be assessed. There is no
analogous "person having ordinary skill in the art" standard, or even an "ordinary
audience for the art," where the fact finder's viewpoint could naturally shift
across different artistic genres. The absence of such a viewpoint for protectability
questions is especially striking given courts' consideration of different choices
for assessing infringement. When assessing product similarity on the
infringement side, courts have both experimented with different perspectives for
different kinds of works and, in some cases, chosen a perspective with genrespecificity already baked into it.36' As a result, when commentators have pointed

355. See Carroll, supra note 21, at 891 ("[C]ourts can choose to use flexible doctrines to strike the
incentives-access balance either on a per-work or per-invention basis, or more broadly along industryspecific or technology-specific lines.").
356. See Michael W. Carroll, One Size DoesNot FitAll: A Frameworkfor TailoringIntellectual
PropertyRights, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1361, 1395 (2009) (observing that "when taken off the rack, a patent or
a copyright appears to be only one size," but, because courts define rights through standards rather than
rules, applying those standards in particular cases tailors "the scope or size of a patent or copyright . .
to conform often to industry-specific, technology-specific, or innovator-specific characteristics"); see
also Burk & Lemley, supranote 21; Carroll, supra note 21.
357. For more on these critiques, see Burk & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1633-38.
358. See 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
359. See Burk & Lemley, supra note 21, at 1648-51 (describing how variance in the skill level of
ordinary practitioners across different fields causes "nominally unitary patent rules to be applied very
differently indeed in directly contradictory ways in different industries").
360. Compare Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 473 (2d Cir. 1946) (adopting a "lay listener" test
rather than one that channeled "the judgment of trained musicians"), with Boisson v. Banian, Ltd., 273
F.3d 262, 272 (2d Cir. 2001) (using a "'more discerning' ordinary observer test" where the plaintiff's
work was largely composed of public-domain materials), andDawsonv. Hinshaw Music Inc., 905 F.2d
731, 736 (4 th Cir. 1990) (using an "intended audience" standard rather than a lay observer one where "the
intended audience is more narrow in that it possesses specialized expertise . . that lay people would
lack"), with Comput. Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713-14 (2d Cir. 1992) (allowing fact
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out copyright doctrine's potential for industry-specificity in the courts, it's often
the infringement test-not the threshold protectability determination-that they
have in mind.361 Originality isn't a natural candidate.
Nevertheless, the cases applying the Jo/lie standard effectively developed
a subject-matter-specific originality track just for musical arrangements.
Sometimes that move was subtle, relying only on musical-derivative precedents
without mentioning their divergence from cases on other subject matter. In
Norden, it was brazen, as the court all but announced that music precedent
occupied an island unto itself 362 Even after Feist, with its ostensibly allencompassing "extremely low" creativity threshold, the Woods court assessed
originality based on what a competent musician was capable of, a standard that
remains good law in the Second Circuit. 363
This goes to show that originality can be a policy lever in copyright law
just as much as infringement doctrines can. It does not, however, necessarily
mean that courts have been pulling the lever in the right direction. To begin with,
for any kind of copyrightable subject matter, demanding more originality may
invite individual judges to promote the expressive contributions of some groups
while demoting those of others, especially those of groups that society has
already marginalized. 364 As Robert Brauneis has recently documented, musical
arrangements' elevated protectability threshold contributed in the 1950s to a
phenomenon of "mirror cover recordings," in which White musicians would
freely copy virtually every distinctive arrangement element of a recording
originally made by African American musicians. 36 When a record label tried to
prevent one such mirror cover through an unfair competition claim, a federal
court brushed aside its musicians' expression as too hackneyed to begin with.366
According to the court, the plaintiff's version of the song had contributed nothing
more than what was already "well known in the art" and "would [have] occur[ed]

finders to channel the perspective of technical experts when assessing "highly complicated and technical
subject matter" such as software).
361. See, e.g., ShyamkrishnaBalganesh,The Normativity ofCopying in CopyrightLaw , 62 DUKE
L.J. 203, 230-31 (2012) (identifying the substantial similarity test as court's subtle way of achieving
"subject-matter-based tailoring" of entitlement scope). Carroll also points to the idea/expression
dichotomy, merger doctrine, and § 113's limitation on protection for the design of useful articles. Carroll,
supra note 21, at 898.
362. See Nordenv. Oliver Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp. 415, 417-18 (D. Mass 1936); see also supra text
accompanying notes 259-58.
363. See Woods v. Bourne Co., 6o F.3d 978, 990-93 (2d Cir. 1995).
364. See generally K. J. Greene, Copyright, Culture & Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal
Protection, 21 HASTINGS COMMC'NS. & ENT. L.J. 339 (1998) (exploring how Black musicians "as a
group, were routinely deprived of legal protection for creative works under the copyright regime").
365. Robert Brauneis, Copyright, Music, and Race: The Case of Mirror Cover Recordings (May
2, 2020) (unpublished manuscript), https://ssm.com/abstract-3591113 [https://perma.cc/24A3-RJLM].
366.
Supreme Recs., Inc. v. Decca Recs., Inc., 90 F. Supp. 904, 913 (S.D. Cal. 1950). The claim
sounded in unfair competition, rather than copyright, because the arrangement in question was neither
published nor registered. Under then-governing law, copyright protection was therefore unavailable.
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to any arranger." 367 As a result, anyone could copy it without paying. That casual
dismissal effectively blessed White artists' continuing uncompensated
duplication of Black artists' recorded performances. 368
The potential for such discriminatory effects is a function of copyright in
general, not of musical subject matter in particular. It would be easier to
understand courts' special treatment of musical arrangements if there were some
policy argument underlying it. But strikingly, across all of the cases and
secondary sources reviewed here, almost no one has ever tried to make such an
argument. The one exception is the heirs seeking termination in Woods. In their
appellate brief, they argued that musical arrangements need an especially high
bar because "every performance of a musical composition is to some extent an
arrangement," with different compositional features varying "from one
performance to another by the same artist."369 That premise may be true so far
as it goes, but it hardly explains the existing case law, in which courts refused to
grant any protection even to those who had added significant expressive elements
like new orchestrations or voice parts.
I suspect, rather, that the best explanation for musical derivatives' curiously
high originality bar is rooted in courts' historically narrow account of what
makes music creative and commercially valuable. Until very recently, courts in
music infringement cases cared only about melodic similarity because, in their
view, melody was a composition's expressive and ontological core. 370 As one of
these decisions would explain, "[i]t is in the melody of the composition-or the
arrangement of notes or tones that originality must be found. It is the
arrangement or succession of musical notes, which are the finger prints of the
composition, and establish its identity." 37 1 That proposition is wrong on its own

terms-there's plenty of nonmelodic musical innovation to go around-but it
grew out of the aesthetic norms of nineteenth-century European art music. 372
Courts looking only for melodic similarity in infringement cases were at least
being consistent in denying
copyrightability cases.

protection

for

nonmelodic

expression

in

Whether or not musical derivatives represent a good place for courts to be
raising the originality bar, though, it's at least worth considering whether other
good places exist. Take, for example, photographs. There is a common
understanding

that

virtually

every photograph

is

subject

to

copyright

protection. 373 The Ninth Circuit has stated that "almost any[ ] photograph may

367.
368.
369.
94-7421).

370.
371.

Id. at 911.
See Brauneis, supra note 365, at 19-20.
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees at 21, Woods v. Bourne Co., 60 F.3d 978 (2d Cir. 1995) (No.

See Fishinan, supra note 141.
N. Music Corp. v. King Rec. Distrib. Co.,

105 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
372. See Fishman, supra note 141, at 1892-1903.
373. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Photographer'sCopyright Photographas Art, Photograph
as Database,25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 373 (2012) ("There is a widespread belief that all photographs
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claim the necessary originality to support a copyright merely by virtue of the

photographers' [sic] personal choice of subject matter, angle of photograph,
lighting, and determination of the precise time when the photograph is to be
taken." 374 Meanwhile, thanks to the ubiquity of smartphones, the estimated
number of new photos annually surpasses a trillion. 375 It's said that it takes two
minutes today to produce the number of photos produced across the entirety of
the 1880s, the decade in which the Supreme Court declared photography to be
copyrightable

subject matter. 376 It may turn out that extending copyright

protection to all of these pictures is overly gumming up digital communications
without much countervailing improvement in creative output. If so, courts could

feasibly raise the quantum of photographic creativity that they deem minimally
sufficient under Feist.377
I mention photographs only by way of example, and I'm not trying to press

the case here for raising their protectability threshold. My point is simply that
Jollie's high-creativity lineage provides some general proof of concept for using
originality as a policy lever to screen out fewer or more works from copyright
protection within genre- or industry-specific contexts. It's a lever that future
research could consider how best to use.
C. IP Doctrine'sHistorical Contingencies

What we may today naturally assume to be immutable principles of IP
doctrine may turn out to be contingent on the quirks of individual litigants and
judges. 378 Jollie's heightened threshold might never have appeared again after
the nineteenth century if not for an especially musically literate lawyer who
resuscitated it in Cooper v. James. It might never have appeared again after the

Supreme Court's decision in Feist if not for an especially musically literate trial
are protected by United States copyright law."); Eva E. Subotnik, OriginalityProxies: Towarda Theory
of Copyrightand Creativity, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1487, 1493 (2011) (describing the "tradition of nearpresumptive copyright protection" in which photographs are categorically treated as "works of
authorship that easily clear the originality threshold outlined by Feist").
374. Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1o68, 1076 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting 1 MELVIN B.
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT

375.

§ 2.o8[E][1],

at 2-130 (1999)).

Matthew L. Schafer, The Photograph That Broke the Internet Isn't Copyrightable, 34
COMMN'CS. L., Winter 2019, at 1, 26.
376. Id
377. The Supreme Court has left more room for screening out everyday photographs than is often
acknowledged. See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59 (1884) (holding that the
particular photograph at issue was copyrightable but nevertheless cautioning that "the ordinary
production of a photograph" may not be protectable). For more on the underused leeway that courts
have to constrain copyright protection for uncreative photographs, see generally Hughes, supra note 373.
Cf Oriental Art Printing, Inc. v. Goldstar Printing Corp., 175 F. Supp. 2d 542, 546 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(holding thatphotographs of food dishes printed on a restaurantmenu presented the "rare case where . .
photographs . . lack the creative or expressive elements that would renderthem original works" because
they "lack any artistic quality").
378. Jessica Litman makes a similar observation in her historical study of one of copyright's most
influential cases, Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930). See Jessica Litman,
Silent Similarity, 14 CHI.-KENT. J. INTELL. PROP. II, 15 (2015).
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judge in Woods v. Bourne. In the extreme, maybe even Hotchkiss itself might

have played out differently-decided, perhaps, based on an argument that the
litigants actually raised-if not for the Justice who happened to have decided
Jollie on virtually identical grounds only a few months earlier.

Of course, we don't know enough about any of the counterfactuals to verify
that these facts caused the doctrine to develop the way that it did. Yet nor do we
know enough about any of them to rule it out. That indeterminacy ought to
counsel us to approach the case law with some degree of circumspection. We
should be open to the possibility that we ended up where we are because of not
just doctrinal percolation and lawyerly debate but also one-off strategic decisions
and idiosyncratic personalities along the way.
As much as I've tried here to make the case that Jollie deserves our
attention, it's unfamiliar even to many copyright specialists for a reason: within
copyright doctrine, only the domain of musical derivatives felt its impact
directly. That narrowness, probably due at least in part to Cooper's cabining of
the case, is itself noteworthy. While Jollie ended up quarantined to musical
subject matter only, other music cases have indelibly transformed copyright law
across all subject matter. Take Arnstein v. Porter, for instance, a 1946 music

plagiarism case that ended up setting the ground rules for every future claim of
infringing similarity. 379 Or, more recently, take Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music,

Inc., a dispute over an alleged parody of a Roy Orbison track that produced a
hugely influential Supreme Court decision on the scope of fair use. 380 As a
closing thought experiment, one might fairly wonder if such a case could
plausibly have been limited to musical works, as Jollie was, and how the
standards for other subject matter might have developed in the case's absence.
CONCLUSION

Virtually every patent law class at least mentions Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.
Virtually no copyright law class-not even my own, though that's going to
change-mentions Jollie v. Jaques. It's a pity, because one can better appreciate

both cases in juxtaposition. Their parallel beginnings reveal a period of leaky
boundaries between copyright and patent, when many of the Justices considered
a rule for one to be just as good for the other. Their recurring intersections,
meanwhile, muddy today's conventional narrative about copyright's historic
commitment to protecting even the most modestly creative works. Jollie's stillgrowing line of cases seems to function as a hidden enclave within originality's
larger domain, playing by rules that the rest of its subjects couldn't get away
with. Ultimately, perhaps, that might be a healthy thing. Originality needn't be
applied uniformly across the myriad kinds of works that it governs.

379.
380.

Amsteinv. Porter, 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946).
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
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The path that Jo/lie and its progeny have blazed is no doubt smaller than
the familiar one that copyright practitioners all know. But those thinking about
how copyright's history might inform its current design should walk that path
every so often. The views are worth it.

